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Did Universal Banks Play a Significant 
Role in the U.S. Economy’s 
Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33?       
A Preliminary Assessment 
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR. 
 Commercial banking organizations were leading participants in 
the U.S. securities markets during the great bull market of the 1920s.1 
Commercial banks again entered the securities markets during the 
1990s, and their reentry coincided with another spectacular rise in the 
stock market. The stock market booms of the 1920s and 1990s were 
extraordinary events in U.S. economic history. As two scholars re-
cently observed, the bull markets of 1923–29 and 1994–2000 “stand 
out, both in terms of their length and rate of advance in the market 
index … . [T]hese two booms were unique in character as well as 
magnitude.”2 
 
 The stock market crashes that followed both booms were also 
unparalleled. From 1929 to 1932, the total value of all common stocks 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) fell by nearly 
85 percent, from US$82.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.3
 
From 2000 to 
2002, the value of all publicly traded U.S. stocks declined by more 
than 40 percent, from US$17 trillion to US$10 trillion.4 
 
 In both the 1920s and the 1990s, commercial banking organiza-
tions were allowed to operate as “universal banks”—that is, diversi-
fied financial conglomerates that offered banking, securities, and 
insurance services.5 Is it merely a coincidence that the two most dra-
matic stock market booms and crashes in U.S. history occurred during 
periods when large commercial banks were major participants in the 
securities markets? Or did the exercise of universal banking powers 
contribute to the financial and economic conditions that produced 
both episodes? This chapter is the first installment of a longer-term 
project that seeks to answer these questions. 
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 This chapter offers a preliminary assessment of the role played by 
universal banks in the economic boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33. 
The first part reviews the successful challenge to universal banking 
mounted by Senator Carter Glass and other advocates of the Banking 
Act of 1933 (popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall Act”).6 The 
Glass-Steagall Act emphatically repudiated the concept of “depart-
ment store banking” (an early version of universal banking).7 Sections 
20 and 32 of the Act required commercial banks to divest the securi-
ties affiliates they had operated during the 1920s, while three other 
sections imposed further restrictions designed to separate banks from 
securities firms.8 
  
 Glass and his supporters contended that banks and their securities 
affiliates helped to produce an inflationary surge in the securities 
markets, resulting in an overproduction of securities and an unsus-
tainable economic boom. Proponents of the Glass-Steagall Act also 
maintained that department store banking created conflicts of interest 
that prevented commercial banks from acting either as impartial lend-
ers or as objective investment advisors. Glass and his colleagues 
claimed that universal banks provided excessive amounts of credit 
and used aggressive marketing campaigns to promote the sale of risky 
securities to unsophisticated investors. The Glass-Steagall Act re-
flected a widely shared belief that banks and their securities affiliates 
encouraged speculative and ultimately ruinous behavior by investors 
and business firms. 
 
 To evaluate the validity of these claims, the second part of this 
chapter examines the role of universal banks during the economic 
boom of the 1920s. In response to a relaxation of legal rules 
governing bank activities, banks greatly expanded their financing of 
business firms and consumers through five major channels—loans on 
securities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real 
estate mortgages, and consumer credit. This financing surge enabled 
business firms and consumers to assume heavy debt burdens and to 
make risky investments that proved to be unviable when the U.S. 
economy entered a sharp recession in the summer of 1929. Many of 
the new investments in plant and equipment were devoted to 
speculative ventures that overestimated the near-term demand for 
products using new technologies. Supply also exceeded demand for 
new cars and for newly constructed residential and commercial real 
estate projects. 




 The crash of 1929 destroyed investor wealth and created great 
uncertainty among consumers and business firms. The business reces-
sion that began in the summer of 1929 was aggravated by the crash, 
and the decline in business activity exposed the hazardous levels of 
debt assumed by consumers and business firms during the boom years 
of the 1920s. Congress decided to separate banks from securities 
firms in 1933, based on its determination that universal banking had 
promoted a dangerous buildup of credit for speculative purposes. 
 
 The Glass-Steagall Act’s barriers to universal banking were se-
verely eroded by market forces and by a series of rulings issued by 
federal regulators and courts during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, 
federal regulators allowed bank holding companies to establish what 
were known as “Section 20 subsidiaries” for the purpose of under-
writing debt and equity securities. By 1996, due to a progressive lib-
eralization of the rules governing Section 20 subsidiaries, banking 
organizations could compete effectively with securities firms. In 
1998, federal regulators allowed Travelers and Citicorp to merge, 
thereby creating Citigroup, the first U.S. universal bank since 1933. 
The creation of Citigroup placed great pressure on Congress to re-
move the Glass-Steagall Act’s limitations on affiliations between 
commercial banks and securities firms.9 
 
 In 1999, Congress responded to these developments by enacting 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).10 GLBA repealed Sections 20 
and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act and also authorized the establish-
ment of universal banking organizations known as financial holding 
companies. Under GLBA, financial holding companies may establish 
separate subsidiaries that engage in a full range of banking, securities, 
and insurance activities.11 
 
 The House and Senate committee reports on GLBA declared that 
the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on universal banking were (1) 
outdated in light of changing market conditions and (2) undesirable 
because they prevented U.S. financial institutions from providing in-
novative services to their customers in the most efficient manner.12 
The chief Senate sponsor of GLBA, Senator Phil Gramm, went even 
further. He denounced the Glass-Steagall Act as a misguided statute 
from the outset. In his view, Congress was frightened by the Depres-
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sion and was driven by “demagoguery” to impose a “punitive … arti-
ficial separation of the financial sector of our economy.”13 
 
 In claiming that the Glass-Steagall Act was an ill-conceived stat-
ute, Senator Gramm echoed the conclusions of works published by 
several scholars during the past two decades. As discussed in the final 
section of the chapter, modern scholars have criticized the 
Glass-Steagall Act on three principal grounds. First, critics argue that 
the Glass-Steagall Act was interest group legislation designed to pro-
tect traditional investment banks from competition with commercial 
banks in the securities underwriting field. Second, critics maintain 
that universal banks were safer than specialized banks and did not 
endanger the banking system. Third, critics claim that Congress did 
not have a substantial basis for its belief that universal banks were 
involved in unsound selling practices and other conflicts of interest. 
 
 Thus, Congress’s partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 
was consistent with a widely shared scholarly view that the 1933 leg-
islation had been “[t]horoughly discredited.”14 However, since the 
bursting of the “new economy” stock market bubble in 2000, com-
mentators have begun to reconsider the benefits and risks of universal 
banking. Investigations and court suits involving Enron and World-
Com revealed that Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase (Morgan Chase), 
and other universal banks played key roles in both scandals. For ex-
ample, Citigroup, Morgan Chase, and other universal banks helped 
Enron to inflate its reported revenues and understate its reported debts 
by (1) extending loans that were disguised as prepay commodity 
trades and (2) arranging sham sales of Enron assets to 
off-balance-sheet entities controlled by Enron. In addition, Citigroup, 
Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and other universal banks served as 
underwriters for two large public offerings of WorldCom debt securi-
ties during 2000 and 2001. Those offerings enabled WorldCom to sell 
US$17 billion of securities to investors at a time when the bank un-
derwriters reportedly knew that WorldCom’s financial condition was 
rapidly deteriorating.15 Similarly, Italian authorities have alleged that 
Citigroup, Bank of America, and other universal banks aided and 
abetted a massive fraud committed by Parmalat’s managers.16 
 
 In 2003, federal regulators and the New York Attorney General, 
Eliot Spitzer, issued consent orders as part of a global settlement with 
10 investment banking firms, including affiliates of five universal 
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banks (Citigroup, Morgan Chase, Credit Suisse, UBS, and U.S. Ban-
corp). According to those consent orders, the 10 firms encouraged 
their research analysts to attract and retain investment banking clients 
by issuing overly optimistic projections of future client performance 
and ignoring client risks that were known to the analysts and their 
investment banking colleagues.17 Federal regulators also issued con-
sent orders finding that (1) Citigroup, Credit Suisse, FleetBoston, and 
Morgan Chase engaged in manipulative and abusive practices involv-
ing initial public offerings,18 and (2) Bank of America, Bank One, 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), and FleetBoston al-
lowed hedge fund operators to make late trades and market-timing 
trades in bank-sponsored mutual funds, resulting in large trading prof-
its for the operators at the expense of ordinary investors in the mutual 
funds.19 
 
 The foregoing scandals and other examples of recent misconduct 
by universal banks will be reviewed in greater detail in a forthcoming 
installment of my project. These scandals have already proven to be 
very costly to universal banks. By August 2005, universal banks and 
other firms paid over US$7 billion to settle Enron-related lawsuits, 
with US$6.6 billion of that amount being paid by CIBC, Citigroup, 
and Morgan Chase. The same three banks paid an additional US$400 
million in penalties to settle Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) charges related to their involvement with Enron.20
 
Universal 
banks and other firms paid more than US$6 billion to settle 
WorldCom-related lawsuits, with US$5 billion of that amount being 
paid by Citigroup, Morgan Chase, and Bank of America. Universal 
banks and other firms also paid US$4.4 billion to settle regulatory 
claims involving analyst conflicts of interest and abusive trading 
practices in mutual funds.21 
 
 In light of the growing evidence of conflicts of interest and other 
abuses involving universal banks during the economic boom from 
1994 to 2000, several commentators have argued that federal regula-
tors and Congress made a mistake in allowing commercial banks to 
establish new affiliations with securities firms. These commentators 
maintain that Congress underestimated the risks that (1) conflicts of 
interest would undermine the ability of universal banks to allocate 
credit and provide investment advice in an objective and impartial 
manner, and (2) competitive pressures in the securities underwriting 
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business would cause both universal banks and securities firms to 
promote unsound and speculative ventures.22 
 
 From a practical viewpoint, it seems very unlikely that the 
Glass-Steagall Act’s separation between commercial and investment 
banking could be revived. Even before GLBA’s enactment in 1999, 
the effectiveness of Glass-Steagall had been significantly undermined 
by market forces and by decisions of federal regulators and courts that 
opened loopholes in the 1933 statute. For example, the rapidly grow-
ing markets for over-the-counter derivatives and syndicated loans 
have allowed banks to provide customers with financial instruments 
that are functionally equivalent to securities.23 However, the recent 
scandals involving universal banks raise serious questions about the 
adequacy of the regulatory structure created by GLBA. In a forthcom-
ing article, I will consider possible reforms that could mitigate the 
risks currently presented by universal banks.  
 
 Accordingly, this chapter does not propose a reenactment of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. However, it will offer a preliminary response to 
the modern, three-part critique of Glass-Steagall. First, I conclude that 
the 1933 legislation was not adopted for the purpose of protecting 
investment banks from competition with commercial banks. Second, 
it appears that Congress did have a substantial basis for its belief that 
universal banks created serious risks for the banking system and the 
general economy. Third, previous scholars have determined, based on 
the Pecora committee’s investigation in 1933, that commercial banks 
and their securities affiliates did engage in unsound and abusive prac-
tices. I believe that the second and third issues warrant additional re-
search, particularly since similar abuses appeared during the 1990s 
when major banks reentered the securities markets. 
 
Congress’s Repudiation of Universal Banking in the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
 The Glass-Steagall Act contained five provisions designed to 
separate commercial banks from the investment banking business.24 
Congress adopted these provisions based on the widely shared view 
that banks and their securities affiliates had played a major role in the 
boom and crash that occurred in U.S. securities markets and the 
broader economy from 1921 to 1933. As shown below, supporters of 
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the Glass-Steagall Act were convinced that banks and their securities 
affiliates had diverted credit away from sound business enterprises 
and, instead, promoted speculative ventures at home and abroad.  
 
 The Act’s chief sponsor, Senator Carter Glass, and his principal 
advisor, Professor H. Parker Willis, subscribed to the “real bills doc-
trine.” Adherents of that doctrine believed that commercial banks 
should restrict their operations to the acceptance of demand deposits 
and the extension of short-term loans to finance the production and 
sale of goods.25 Senator Glass, Representative Henry Steagall, and 
other members of Congress alleged that large banks had abandoned 
sound banking principles during the 1920s and, instead, had promoted 
“stock-gambling” and an “overinvestment in securities of all kinds.”26 
Glass, Steagall, and their supporters maintained that large banks had 
encouraged reckless speculation in two ways—first, by using their 
own funds to make excessive loans on securities and investments in 
securities, and second, by persuading retail investors and small corre-
spondent banks to convert their deposits and investments in U.S. gov-
ernment securities into high-risk corporate, municipal, and foreign 
securities underwritten by bank securities affiliates.27 
 
 Thus, Congress viewed the activities of banks and their securities 
affiliates as a fundamental cause of the economic boom and crash that 
occurred during the period 1921–33. Steagall, for example, declared 
that the entry of banks into the securities markets produced a situation 
in which 
[o]ur great banking system was diverted from its original 
purposes into investment activities, and its service devoted to 
speculation and international high finance… . Agriculture, 
commerce, and industry were forgotten. Bank deposits and 
credit resources were funneled into the speculative centers of 
the country for investment in stocks [sic] operation and in 
market speculation. Values were lifted to fictitious levels.28  
 
 Senator Frederick Walcott argued that this “gambling fever” and 
“flood tide of speculation” would never have occurred without the 
credit and distribution facilities provided by large banks and their se-
curities affiliates. In Walcott’s view, traditional investment banking 
firms like J.P. Morgan and Kuhn Loeb could never have arranged and 
financed the rapid expansion in securities underwriting, trading, and 
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selling that took place during the 1920s. Such an expansion required 
much broader distribution capabilities and “very expansive credit, 
which, of course, brought in the banks.” As for bank securities affili-
ates, “their growth has been phenomenal, coincident with the growth 
of the security business.”29 
 
Representative Hamilton Fish agreed that large banks and their 
securities affiliates were primarily responsible for the speculative “in-
flation” that led to the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression: 
[T]hese bank presidents … got us into this inflation largely 
through these securities affiliates connected with the big 
banks. …  
All the time they were saying to their depositors, “You have 
got money in our banks, and you ought to take it out of our 
banks and invest it.” … Those securities affiliates did more 
harm in promoting the inflation and the resulting deflation 
that caused the financial ruin of hundreds of thousands of 
bank depositors than any other agency in America. …  
There was an enormous inflation brought about because of 
the mass overproduction of stocks, bonds, and other 
securities largely emanating from these affiliates, … and as a 
result it meant a mass overproduction of factories, 
commodities, real estate, and everything else—an enormous 
inflation that sooner or later had to crash. …30 
 
 While noting the dangers of speculation, Senator Robert Bulkley 
focused on conflicts of interest that were created by affiliations be-
tween banks and securities dealers. In Bulkley’s view, a bank con-
nected with a securities affiliate could not provide fair and impartial 
investment advice to its depositors and its trust customers, because 
the bank had a vested interest in promoting securities that were un-
derwritten or distributed by the affiliate. Nor could such a bank be 
expected to make objective lending decisions, because it would be 
tempted to make unsound loans to support its securities affiliate or the 
customers of that affiliate.31 Bulkley explained that 
 
the greatest protection to depositors that we have given in 
[the Glass-Steagall Act] is … [by] prohibiting a banker from 
having an interest contrary to his depositors, by prohibiting 
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him from being interested in securities which he recom-
mends his depositor to buy, by … removing the bankers 
from the temptation of using credit in such a way as to make 
a good background and foundation for the flotation [of] more 
security issues. …32 
 
 Similar concerns about conflicts of interest were expressed in a 
1931 staff report prepared by a Senate subcommittee during hearings 
on the securities activities of banks. This report identified a number of 
potential dangers created by affiliations between banks and securities 
dealers, including the following: 
 (i) the bank might make risky loans or capital contributions to a 
securities affiliate, particularly as “[t]he bank is closely connected in 
the public mind with its affiliates, and should the latter suffer large 
losses it is practically unthinkable that they would be allowed to 
fail”;33  
 (ii) the bank could purchase stock from a securities affiliate to 
“relieve the affiliate of excess holdings”;34  
 (iii) the bank could make risky loans to a securities affiliate’s 
customers in order to “facilitate” the affiliate’s distribution of 
securities;35  
 (iv) a securities affiliate might try to support the market price of 
the bank’s stock by using aggressive or manipulative trading 
practices;36  
 (v) a securities affiliate might consider the bank’s depositors as 
“its preferred list of sales prospects,” and the depositors’ confidence 
in the bank would be severely shaken if they lost money after pur-
chasing securities that were underwritten or distributed by the affili-
ate;37 and  
 (vi) in general, the bank and its securities affiliate would be 
tempted to take greater risks because of their assumption that (a) the 
affiliate could rely on the “resources of the bank” and (b) the bank 
could remove poorly performing loans or investments from its bal-
ance sheet by transferring them to its affiliate.38 
As discussed in this chapter, the Senate investigation led by Ferdi-
nand Pecora in 1933 focused much of its attention on alleged conflicts 
of interest involving large banks and their securities affiliates. 
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 During Senate hearings in 1931 and Senate floor debates in 
1932,   participants frequently mentioned two major financial 
conglomerates—Caldwell and Company and Bank of United States—
that collapsed during the autumn of 1930.39 As discussed below, both 
organizations controlled securities subsidiaries that engaged in risky 
activities and relied heavily on loans provided by affiliated banks.40 
During final deliberations on the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, 
members of Congress also commented on the recent failures of four 
large Detroit and Cleveland banks. All four banks had securities 
affiliates, and the failures of those banks helped to precipitate a 
nationwide banking panic culminating in President Roosevelt’s 
declaration of a national bank holiday in March 1933.41 
 
 Commercial banks and the Hoover administration strongly op-
posed Senator Glass’s proposed legislation in 1931 and 1932 and 
were successful in preventing its passage. However, the election of 
President Franklin Roosevelt and a heavily Democratic Congress in 
November 1932 greatly increased the political leverage held by Glass 
and his supporters. Glass himself made a nationwide radio address on 
Roosevelt’s behalf in the closing days of the 1932 campaign. In that 
speech, he condemned the “great banking institutions” for having 
used their “lawless affiliates” to sell worthless securities to American 
investors. During the spring of 1933, commercial banking interests 
lost all remaining power to block the Glass bill, due to the devastating 
impact of the nationwide banking panic and the public outrage trig-
gered by the Pecora committee’s investigation of bank securities af-
filiates. In addition, many banks voluntarily decided to shut down 
their securities affiliates, because they could not afford to absorb the 
affiliates’ expenses and losses.42 Consequently, effective opposition 
to the Glass bill virtually disappeared and Congress passed the 
Glass-Steagall Act on June 16, 1933.43 
 
 
The Role of Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33 
 As shown in the preceding section, the Glass-Steagall Act re-
flected Congress’s belief that commercial banks and their securities 
affiliates helped to generate an unsustainable economic boom during 
the late 1920s. Senator Glass had no doubt on this score, arguing that 
bank securities affiliates “were the largest contributors, next to the 
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gambling on the stock exchange, to the disaster which was precipi-
tated on this country in 1929.”44 The conclusions of Senator Glass 
and his supporters rested in part on the fact that the stock market 
boom of the 1920s coincided with the rapid expansion of bank in-
volvement in the securities markets: 
[F]rom just a common-sense, cause-and-effect standpoint, 
one could easily make a formidable argument against the se-
curity affiliate system. No sooner had [banks become major 
participants in the securities markets] than the great bull 
market had gotten under way! During the period from 1928 
through 1930, commercial banks had substantially increased 
their market share of the new bond issues and had begun to 
make inroads into the equity market. No matter what signifi-
cance one might give that development today, certainly to 
the national legislators of the early 1930s the probable corre-
lation must have made a strong impression. This was particu-
larly true of a financial “purist” like Carter Glass.45 
 
 As described in this section, banks contributed to the economic 
boom of the late 1920s through five different channels—loans on se-
curities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real es-
tate lending, and consumer credit. All of these channels generated a 
surge of new financing, which greatly increased the debt burdens of 
business firms and consumers and encouraged speculative invest-
ments by both groups. 
 
Banks Became Leading Participants in the Securities Markets 
During the 1920s 
The Rapid Expansion of Bank Securities Activities  
 During the decade preceding the stock market crash, banks 
greatly expanded their involvement in the securities markets in three 
areas: (1) making loans collateralized by securities (known as “loans 
on securities” or “security loans”), (2) making investments in securi-
ties, and (3) participating in the underwriting and distribution of secu-
rities. Bank loans on securities increased from US$5.2 billion to 
US$13 billion between 1919 and 1930. As a result, the share of total 
bank credit represented by security loans rose from 24 percent to 
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38 percent during that period. Banks accounted for more than 
85 percent of all loans on securities made from 1919 to 1930.46 
 
 Bank investments in securities grew from US$8.4 billion to 
US$13.7 billion between 1921 and 1930. Four-fifths of this growth 
resulted from purchases of higher-risk issues, including state and mu-
nicipal bonds, corporate bonds, and foreign securities. As a conse-
quence, holdings of low-risk U.S. government securities declined 




 Large banks also established a major presence in the securities 
underwriting business. The entry of banks into the underwriting busi-
ness marked the final stage in the expansion of bank securities activi-
ties during the 1920s. During the early 1900s, the Comptroller of the 
Currency (the regulator of national banks) informally permitted na-
tional banks to establish bond departments so that they could compete 
with the investment banking activities conducted by state-chartered 
banks and trust companies. Through their bond departments, national 
banks actively bought and sold bonds issued by state and local gov-
ernments and by domestic corporations. The McFadden Act of 1927 
ratified the legitimacy of these bond departments, because the statute 
authorized national banks to buy and sell marketable debt securities.48 
 
 Neither the original National Bank Act nor the McFadden Act 
allowed national banks to underwrite securities or to invest in equity 
stocks.49 However, beginning in 1908 national banks circumvented 
this limitation on their authority by organizing separately incorpo-
rated securities affiliates that engaged in a full range of underwriting, 
distribution, and dealing activities involving both bonds and stocks. 
Prior to the Great Depression, neither Congress nor federal regulators 
interfered with the activities of bank securities affiliates.50 
 
 Political and economic developments encouraged banks to ex-
pand their involvement in securities underwriting and distribution 
after 1920. During World War I, the federal government enlisted 
banks as major participants in the selling campaigns for the govern-
ment’s war bonds, known as “Liberty Loans.” More than 20 million 
Americans bought Liberty bonds, and banks sold more than half of 
the US$21 billion of Liberty bonds issued by the federal govern-
ment.51 By participating in the Liberty bond campaigns, banks be-
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came “familiar with the technique of distributing securities [and] 
gained many contacts with investors and won their confidence, partly 
because of their patriotic mission, partly because they offered bonds 
of unquestioned soundness.”52 
 
 One of the leaders of the Liberty bond effort, Charles Mitchell, 
became president of the securities affiliate of National City Bank 
(NCB) in 1916 and became president of the Bank itself in 1921. 
Mitchell predicted that sales of Liberty bonds would create “a large, 
new army of investors in this country who have never heretofore 
known what it means to own a coupon bond and who may in the fu-
ture be developed into savers and bond buyers.”53 As Mitchell ex-
pected, the successful Liberty bond campaigns helped to stimulate a 
rapid growth in investor demand for corporate bonds and stocks dur-
ing the economic boom of the 1920s. Politicians, economists, and fi-
nancial analysts also promoted investor confidence in securities by 
proclaiming that the U.S. economy had entered a new era of perma-
nent prosperity. Belief in this “new era” was based on several factors: 
The first premise of the “new economics,” as [the new era] 
was otherwise called, was that the business cycle … had 
been effectively abolished by the establishment of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in 1913. … The Federal Reserve, with 
its ability to control interest rates and conduct “open market 
operations” … was hailed in the 1920s as “the remedy to the 
whole problem of booms, slumps, and panics.” … 
Alongside the belief in the omnipotence of the Federal Re-
serve, a variety of additional explanations were offered for 
the endurance of the “Coolidge prosperity” which had com-
menced with the election of President Calvin Coolidge in 
1924. … They included the extension of free trade, the de-
cline of inflation, and a more scientific style of corporate 
management. … 
The relaxation of the antitrust laws during Coolidge’s 
presidency allowed for a series of mergers of banking, 
railroad, and utility companies that promised greater 
economies of scale and more efficient production. Gains in 
productivity, which rose by over 50 percent between 1919 
and 1927, were ascribed to increasing investment in research 
and development. … 
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In 1927, John Moody, founder of the credit ratings agency, 
declared that “no one can examine the panorama of business 
and finance in America during the past half-dozen years 
without realizing that we are living in a new era.” In April of 
that year Barron’s, the investment weekly, envisaged a “new 
era without depressions.” … Even Herbert Hoover’s accep-
tance speech in the summer of 1928, when he declared the 
end of poverty to be in sight, was marked by the prevailing 
“new era” optimism.54 
 
 Faith in this new era of risk-free prosperity encouraged a spec-
tacular growth of the securities markets during the 1920s.55 A finan-
cial writer declared in 1924 that “[w]e are living in the day of the 
small investor, and the small investor is the real owner of Wall 
Street.”56 Commercial banks had been the primary providers of credit 
to large corporations before 1920. During the 1920s, however, grow-
ing investor demand for securities permitted large corporations to re-
duce their borrowing from banks and to satisfy their funding needs by 
selling bonds and equity stocks.57 Large firms used public offerings of 
securities to finance extensive new corporate investments in plant fa-
cilities, equipment, and office buildings.58 A 1925 report by Moody’s 
Investors Service noted that the “vast new buying power [of American 
investors and businessmen] is almost dominating the security market 
… and is seeking new avenues of expansion in all domestic industries 
and in foreign fields.”59 
 
 In response to these developments, major banks expanded their 
investment banking activities in order to maintain and strengthen their 
relationships with retail and commercial customers. Banks sought to 
increase the loyalty of their retail customers by providing investment 
advice and by selling securities to their depositors and trust clients. 
Banks also hoped that securities underwriting services would offset 
the decline in their commercial lending business and strengthen their 
business relationships with large corporations.60 Major banks there-
fore adopted a new strategy of “department store banking” designed 
to offer “complete financial facilities” to both retail and commercial 
customers.61  
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 From 1922 to 1929, the number of banks engaged in underwriting 
securities, either through bond departments or securities affiliates, 
more than doubled, rising from 277 to 591.62 In 1927, banks and their 
affiliates originated 22 percent and participated in 37 percent of all 
domestic and foreign bonds issued in the United States. From 1929 to 
1930, banks and their affiliates originated 45 percent and participated 
in more than half of all such bond issues.63 Banks were also involved 
to a lesser degree in underwriting and distributing common and pre-
ferred stocks and shares of investment trusts.64 
 
 NCB and Chase National Bank (Chase), the two largest U.S. 
banks, established securities affiliates with offices located across the 
nation and in major foreign cities. NCB’s affiliate, National City 
Company (NCC), was organized in 1911 and acquired N.W. Halsey 
and Company in 1916. By 1929, NCC operated offices in more than 
50 U.S. cities and several foreign cities, and NCC’s sales representa-
tives were also posted in many of NCB’s foreign branches.65 Chase’s 
affiliate, Chase Securities Corporation (CSC), was organized in 1917 
and acquired Harris Forbes & Co. in 1930, thereby establishing a 
similar network that included offices in more than 50 U.S. cities and 
several foreign cities.66 Other large U.S. banks sought to compete by 
establishing securities affiliates with interstate sales offices. Like 
NCC and CSC, these affiliates often expanded by acquiring estab-
lished investment banking firms.67  
 
The Role of Banks in Promoting the Stock Market Boom  
 By the end of the 1920s, due to their central role in distributing 
securities to the public, “commercial banks [were] by far the most 
important element in the investment banking business.”68 Commercial 
banks and their affiliates distributed more than half of all securities 
sold in the United States during the period from 1927 to 1931, and 
NCC was the largest retail distributor of securities during that pe-
riod.69 From 1921 to 1929, NCC was involved, as originator or as a 
syndicate participant, in selling one-fifth of all domestic and foreign 
bonds issued in the United States.70  
 
 Contemporary observers concluded, and modern scholars agree, 
that the securities boom of the 1920s could not have reached the same 
magnitude without the involvement of large commercial banks and 
their securities affiliates. For several reasons, major banks were in a 
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preferred position to establish large-scale networks for distributing 
securities. Banks could easily extend loans to facilitate the sale of se-
curities by drawing upon their deposits. In addition, banks could cul-
tivate their close relationships with corporate issuers, and they could 
mobilize a large customer base that included depositors, trust custom-
ers, and small correspondent banks.71 The securities distribution fa-
cilities of banks and their affiliates were indispensable to the 
syndicate operations of the 1920s, because “the sales staffs and capi-
tal of existing private investment banking firms were not adequate to 
handle the great volume of securities being issued.”72 
 
 NCC became a top securities underwriter based on the unrivaled 
“placing power” provided by its retail distribution system. NCC 
maintained close relationships with J.P. Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb, 
which led more than half of the syndicates in which NCC participated 
during the period from 1921 to 1929. The Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb 
firms relied heavily on NCC’s distribution network, because they had 
“no retail distribution [facilities] of their own.”73 
  
 Under Charles Mitchell’s leadership, NCC developed a highly 
sophisticated program of mass advertising and direct marketing that 
was carefully designed to sell securities to middle-income investors. 
As already noted, NCC maintained a far-flung network of offices 
staffed by hundreds of sales representatives.74 Its headquarters office 
sent out a steady stream of “flashes” to its regional offices containing 
investment recommendations and offers of cash prizes and other in-
centives for good performance by sales representatives.75 Mitchell 
declared that NCC’s goal was to “spread the gospel of thrift and sav-
ing and investment” and to “bring the investment banking house to 
the people in such a way that they would look upon it as a part and 
parcel of their everyday life.”76 
 
 NCC also advertised extensively in national magazines. NCC’s 
advertisements “assured prospective customers that if they saved, it 
would advise them how to invest.”77 For example, one of NCC’s 
magazine advertisements advised customers that 
… the investor should not try to decide alone. He can get the 
considered opinion of a world-wide investment organiza-
tion—it is his for the asking. [NCC’s] judgment as to which 
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bonds are best for you is based on both strict investigation of 
the security and analysis of your own requirements.78 
 
 Mitchell explained to his employees that NCC’s goal was to win 
the confidence of small investors and to convince them that they 
should rely on NCC’s recommendations. Mitchell readily admitted 
that the ordinary investor could not be expected to make informed 
decisions. He therefore acknowledged that NCC owed a duty of trust 
to its retail customers:  
We have gained the confidence of the investor and we are 
building our institution upon that confidence. We want the 
public to feel safe with us. We are going to make more ex-
acting our yard-stick, because the small investor who buys 
from us today a thousand or five hundred dollar bond is not 
in a position to know whether that security is good or not 
and must rely on us. … [W]e recognize that as between our-
selves and this small investor, the law of caveat emptor can-
not apply, and that if we are to fulfill our trust, we must 
supply that which means safety and a reasonable return to 
him.79 
 
 Unfortunately, Mitchell’s recognition of NCC’s duty of trust to 
its customers seemed to disappear whenever NCC needed to achieve 
its sales objectives. In one sales flash he warned sales representatives: 
I should hate to think there is any man in our sales crowd 
who would confess to his inability to sell at least some of 
any issue of either bonds or preferred stock that we think 
good enough to offer. In fact, this would be an impossible 
situation and in the interest of all concerned, one which we 
would not permit to continue.80
 
 
 Mitchell and NCC were successful in winning the trust of small 
investors during the 1920s. By 1929, NCC was the “largest distributor 
of securities in the world,” while its affiliate, NCB, was the “largest 
bank in the country … and was challenging Britain’s Midland Bank 
for the position of largest bank in the world.”81 Along with J.P. Mor-
gan, Jr., Mitchell and Albert Wiggin (president of Chase) were “lead-
ing social, political, and economic figures … [who were] followed in 
the newspapers like movie stars or politicians.”82 Critic Edmund Wil-
576 y The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33 
 
son described Mitchell as “the banker of bankers, the salesman of 
salesmen, the genius of the New Economic Era.”83 
 
 Mitchell and Wiggin viewed themselves as guardians of the stock 
market, and they vigorously advocated the benefits of bank securities 
affiliates. Mitchell responded aggressively when the stock market 
weakened and interest rates on brokers’ call loans rose sharply in 
March 1929. Market participants feared that call loans might soon be 
scarce, because the Federal Reserve Board was pressuring banks not 
to provide credit for speculation in the stock markets. Mitchell stabi-
lized the stock market by publicly announcing that NCB would make 
available up to US$25 million in new call loans. He declared that “we 
have an obligation which is paramount to any Federal Reserve 
warning, or anything else, to avert any dangerous crisis in the money 
market.”84 
 
 Similarly, on October 15, 1929, Mitchell tried to reassure inves-
tors by stating publicly that “[t]he markets generally are now in a 
healthy condition … [and] values have a sound basis in the general 
prosperity of our country.”85 When the Great Crash began in earnest 
nine days later, Mitchell, Wiggin, and other leading Wall Street bank-
ers organized a publicly announced pool to support the stock market 
by purchasing pivotal stocks. However, the bankers’ pool could not 
arrest the steady slide of the stock market, and the bankers were 
shown to be powerless by October 29th.86 
 
 John Kenneth Galbraith has observed that “[f]ew men ever lost 
position so rapidly as did the New York bankers in the five days from 
October 24 to October 29.”87 During the 1931 Senate hearings, Wig-
gin asserted that “[t]he whole country is stock-minded … [and] are 
waiting for a rebound to-day,” but his optimism seemed hollow.88 
During the same hearings, Wiggin, Mitchell, and other leading bank 
executives strongly opposed Senator Glass’s proposal to separate 
commercial banks from their securities affiliates. Wiggin argued that 
securities affiliates provided “an essential banking service in financ-
ing the large corporations … and other clients of the banks.”89 
Mitchell disputed Senator Walcott’s suggestion that securities affili-
ates of banks had contributed to the “increase in public credulence 
[sic] or gullibility” and had helped to generate a “whirlpool of specu-
lation” in the securities markets. Mitchell claimed that “[t]he invest-
ment bankers of the country are not the framers of public opinion. 
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They must yield to the will of the investing public.”90 Mitchell’s de-
scription of Wall Street bankers as the submissive servants of public 
opinion contrasted sharply with his lecture to NCC’s employees 12 
years earlier, when he declared that NCC must spread “the gospel of 
thrift and saving and investment” and “bring the investment banking 
house to the people.”91 
 
 The public influence of Wiggin and Mitchell was already waning 
in 1931 and was completely destroyed by the Pecora committee’s in-
vestigation in 1933. Mitchell and Wiggin were personally disgraced 
and resigned as bank officers. NCB and Chase voluntarily decided to 
divest their securities affiliates in March 1933, even before Congress 
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act.92
 
 
Bank Involvement in the Securities and Credit Markets Helped to 
Produce an Unsustainable Economic Boom During the 1920s 
The Role of Banks in the Financing Boom  
 The rapid expansion of bank securities activities during the 1920s 
helped to generate an unprecedented boom in the securities markets. 
From 1919 to 1929, U.S. corporations issued US$49 billion of securi-
ties, including US$19.5 billion of stocks and US$29.5 billion of 
bonds and notes. Annual offerings of corporate securities more than 
tripled during this period, rising from US$2.7 billion in 1919 to 
US$9.4 billion in 1929.93
 
State and local governments issued more 
than US$14 billion of debt securities during the 1920s, with the ma-
jority of that amount being sold during the second half of the dec-
ade.94 Foreign governments and foreign corporations sold 
US$11 billion of securities to U.S. investors between 1919 and 1929, 
with the largest amounts being offered during the period 1924 to 
1928.95 As indicated by these figures, all types of securities were is-
sued in much greater volumes as banks and their affiliates expanded 
their role in the securities markets during the second half of the 
1920s. 
 
 The extraordinary boom in the securities markets was also mani-
fested by dramatic increases in trading volumes and price levels. An-
nual trading volume on the NYSE more than quadrupled during the 
1920s, rising from 230 million shares in 1920 to 1.1 billion shares in 
1929.96 The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) recorded a sixfold 
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increase, rising from 64 in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929. 
The price-earnings ratio for the Standard & Poor’s Composite Index 
of stocks also rose by a factor of six during the 1920s and reached 
32.6 in September 1929, a record that endured until the great bull 
market of the 1990s reached its peak in early 2000.97 
 
 Economists have concluded that the stock market boom produced 
a speculative bubble during 1928 and 1929.98 Those are the same two 
years during which (1) commercial banks and their affiliates recorded 
the most rapid growth in their securities underwriting and retail sales 
activities, and (2) Wall Street investment banking firms responded by 
selling units in hundreds of investment trusts (forerunners of today’s 
mutual funds) to small investors.99 Mass-marketing techniques used 
by bank securities affiliates and by investment trusts attracted large 
pools of investment funds from middle-class individuals who had 
largely avoided the securities markets before 1920. This huge infu-
sion of retail investor funds produced a spectacular growth in the total 
financing made available to U.S. corporations. One-third of all debt 
and equity securities issued by domestic companies from 1919 to 
1929 were sold during the last two years of that period. Thus, the en-
try of commercial banks into the securities markets triggered an in-
tense rivalry with securities firms, resulting in an overissue of new 
securities that contributed to the speculative bubble of 1928–29.100 
 
 The existence of a bubble in the securities markets is further indi-
cated by the stunning declines in stock and bond values, and the sig-
nificant increases in bond defaults, following the Crash of 1929. 
Between September 1929 and July 1932, the DJIA fell from 381 to 41 
and the aggregate value of all NYSE-listed stocks declined from 
US$82.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.101 More than a quarter of all do-
mestic bonds issued during the 1920s defaulted during the 1930s, and 
default rates were particularly high for domestic bonds issued after 
1926.102 Market values declined significantly even for those domestic 
bond issues that did not default during the 1930s.103 Purchasers of 
foreign bonds suffered the worst losses. More than a third of all for-
eign bonds sold to U.S. investors during the 1920s had defaulted by 
1937, including three-quarters of all bonds sold by Eastern European 
and Latin American issuers.104 
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The Expansion of Bank Real Estate Loans and Consumer Credit  
 In addition to their rapidly growing involvement in the securities 
markets, commercial banks greatly expanded their real estate lending 
activities after World War I. Between 1913 and 1927, Congress 
passed statutes that significantly broadened the authority of commer-
cial banks to make loans secured by real estate.105 Bank real estate 
loans more than tripled from 1919 to 1929, with most of those loans 
being made in urban markets.106 The rapid growth of bank real estate 
lending was part of a broader trend. Between 1919 and 1930, the total 
amount of U.S. nonfarm mortgage debt rose from US$8 billion to 
over US$30 billion. Banks, savings institutions, and life insurance 
companies held more than US$24 billion of this debt, while the re-
maining US$6 billion was held in the form of real estate bonds se-
cured by mortgages on apartment buildings and office buildings. 
Commercial banks held about US$5.5 billion of real estate loans and 
bonds on their balance sheets in 1930.107 
 
 The dramatic growth of real estate financing during the 1920s 
fueled a spectacular real estate boom that mirrored the bull market in 
securities. From 1921 to 1929, more than US$75 billion was ex-
pended on private and public construction projects, including almost 
US$35 billion spent in building new housing units. Urban real estate 
values doubled during the same period. Construction of detached, 
one- to four-family homes declined after 1926, but construction of 
new apartment buildings and office buildings continued at a rapid 
pace until 1929.108 As the Senate Banking Committee observed in 
1933, the “immense increase in the volumes of real-estate bond issues 
and of real-estate mortgages both in banks and [other] financial insti-
tutions” created a speculative boom that resulted in many “overbuilt” 
urban real estate markets by 1929.109 
 
 In addition to funds from newly issued securities and real estate 
loans, a third source of new financing during the 1920s was the 
growth of consumer nonmortgage credit. From 1919 to 1929, 
consumer installment debt rose from US$1.9 billion to US$4.9 billion 
and total consumer nonmortgage debt increased from US$2.9 billion 
to US$7.6 billion. Expanded consumer credit allowed Americans to 
buy vast quantities of cars, radios, phonographs, household 
appliances, furniture, jewelry, and other durable consumer goods. 
Postwar consumer purchases of durable goods were spurred by (1) 
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pent-up demand that could not be satisfied during the economic 
austerity of World War I, (2) increases in disposable income created 
by a decade of prosperity, and (3) improvements in convenience and 
entertainment offered by a wide range of new consumer products. For 
example, car registrations rose from 11 million to 26 million between 
1921 and 1929, and automobile loans were the single largest source 
of consumer installment credit. Nonmortgage consumer credit was 
offered to consumers by manufacturers, merchants, consumer finance 
companies, and some commercial banks (including NCB). In 
addition, commercial banks provided most of the indirect financing 
for nonmortgage consumer credit by purchasing consumer installment 
notes or by making loans to manufacturers, merchants, and finance 
companies.110 
 
The Vulnerability of the U.S. Economy to a Severe Economic 
Downturn in 1929  
 As shown in the preceding section, commercial banks participated 
in the financing boom of the 1920s through five different channels—
loans on securities, securities investments, public offerings of 
securities, real estate lending, and consumer credit. The financing 
boom of the 1920s created two conditions that contributed to the 
onset and severity of the Great Depression. First, abundant credit 
allowed both the private and public sectors to assume heavy debt 
burdens, resulting in a national economy that was extremely fragile at 
the end of the 1920s. By 1929, total private and public debt probably 
exceeded US$200 billion, with more than 80 percent of that amount 
being owed by private firms and individuals. This aggregate debt 
burden was more than double the nation’s total annual income of 
US$87 billion. Total debt service as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) rose to 9 percent for the United States in 1929, 
compared to only 3.9 percent for Canada.111 This highly leveraged 
situation exposed consumers, state and local governments, and 
business firms to devastating financial shocks during the Great 
Depression.112 
 
 Second, the explosion of debt and equity finance during the 1920s 
encouraged excessive investments in real estate, industrial plant and 
equipment, and public facilities. From 1921 to 1929, almost 
US$35 billion was invested in new housing, US$55 billion was spent 
for new plant facilities and equipment, and at least US$10 billion was 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. y 581 
 
 
expended by public agencies for roads, schools, and public utilities.113 
Industrial production increased by 40 percent from 1922 to 1929, re-
flecting large investments in new manufacturing facilities.114 
 
 Many of the housing subdivisions, apartment buildings, and of-
fice buildings constructed during the 1920s proved to be poorly 
planned and economically unviable when the real estate boom 
ended.115 Similarly, much of the new investment in plant and equip-
ment was committed to speculative and ultimately unsuccessful ven-
tures. Many high-flying companies of the 1920s were relatively 
young firms, which tried to exploit new technologies that had cap-
tured the imagination of Wall Street bankers and individual investors. 
The most fashionable and speculative stocks of the 1920s were issued 
by companies involved with aircraft, automobiles, chemicals, electri-
cal equipment and appliances, electrical utilities, motion pictures, 
phonographs, radios, and retail stores. Du Pont, Fox Films, General 
Electric, General Motors, Montgomery Ward, Radio Corporation of 
America, RKO, United Aircraft and Transport, and Westinghouse 
were notable examples of the glamour stocks of the 1920s.116 
 
 Many younger firms in high-tech businesses failed during the 
1920s or subsequently during the Depression, resulting in significant 
losses in both investment value and productivity. Those failures were 
consistent with a typical pattern of industrial development in which 
(1) numerous firms enter a new field with plans to exploit an emerg-
ing technology; (2) a highly competitive shakeout period ensues, re-
sulting in the failure or absorption of most entrants; and (3) the 
industry evolves into a more stable oligopoly dominated by a few 
leading firms.117 For example, despite the tremendous increase in 
automobile production and sales during the 1920s, the number of car 
manufacturers declined from 104 to 30 and the number of automobile 
tire producers fell from 274 to 93 during the same decade.118 Simi-
larly, Wall Street bankers and investors poured too much financing 
into radio, motion pictures, and other high-tech industries based on 
unrealistic expectations of how quickly those fields would produce 
steady growth and solid profits.119 Markets for automobiles, radios, 
and other high-tech goods were saturated by the end of the 1920s, as 
indicated by the rapid growth of business inventories during 1929.120 
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 The stock market bubble of 1928–29 produced a final burst of 
new investment funds for the U.S. economy. U.S. corporations issued 
US$16.3 billion of bonds and stocks during those two years, account-
ing for one-third of all domestic corporate securities issued between 
1919 and 1929. As previously noted, bank securities affiliates and 
investment trusts were instrumental in finding purchasers to absorb 
this huge volume of new securities.121 The final stage of the stock 
market boom encouraged many business firms to make speculative 
investments in commercial real estate and industrial facilities. Con-
struction of apartment buildings, office buildings, and plant facilities 
rose sharply in 1928–29, along with investments in business equip-
ment and inventories. It appears that the financing surge of 1928–29 
induced firm managers to make costly new investments based on their 
expectation that demand would continue to grow in line with the 
boom years of 1924–28.122 
 
 Unfortunately, the rosy expectations fueled by the stock market 
bubble proved to be unfounded. The U.S. economy began to weaken 
in the summer of 1929, as both construction activity and automobile 
production declined.123 Consumption of durable goods by consumers 
plummeted following the crash of 1929, leading to a sharp drop in 
business investments in plant, equipment, and inventories. As a con-
sequence, GDP declined by 10 percent and industrial output fell by 
21 percent during the period 1929–30.124 In view of the rapid declines 
in consumer consumption, industrial output, and business investment 
of 1929–30, it seems clear that the crash of 1929 triggered a severe 
economic downturn by (1) destroying investor wealth; (2) creating 
uncertainty among investors, consumers, and business managers; and 




 To sum up, commercial banks were leading participants in the 
expansion of debt and equity financing during the 1920s. The surge 
of new financing fueled a speculative economic boom that encour-
aged consumers and business firms to assume heavy debt burdens and 
to make speculative investments. The boom left the U.S. economy in 
an extremely fragile condition at the end of 1929.126
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 Commercial banks and other financial institutions were not solely 
responsible for the boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33. The Federal 
Reserve’s decisions on monetary policy played a major role in both 
the boom and the collapse. A detailed analysis of the Federal Re-
serve’s actions during 1921–33 is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. However, I will note three aspects of the Federal Re-
serve’s policy that have been heavily criticized by both contemporary 
and modern scholars. 
 
 First, the Federal Reserve adopted “easy-money” policies in 1924 
and 1927, thereby encouraging the financing boom that continued 
through late 1929. In 1924 and again in 1927, the Federal Reserve cut 
the discount rate and purchased large amounts of government securi-
ties. Both episodes were motivated by domestic and foreign consid-
erations. The Federal Reserve wanted to reduce interest rates to 
counteract mild downturns in the U.S. economy that occurred in 1924 
and 1927. In addition, the Federal Reserve wanted to help the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany in their efforts to reestablish the gold 
standard in 1924–25, and to preserve the gold standard in 1927. By 
producing easier credit conditions, the Federal Reserve’s policy ac-
tions in 1924 and 1927 supported the securities markets and helped to 
extend the nation’s economic prosperity. Unfortunately, the Federal 
Reserve’s actions also encouraged speculative behavior. The Federal 
Reserve’s apparent ability to fine-tune the economy and sustain the 
postwar boom led many financial institutions, investors, and business 
firms to believe that the business cycle had been tamed.127 
 
 The Federal Reserve’s second error was to pursue an overly re-
strictive monetary policy in 1928–29. The Federal Reserve wanted to 
curb excessive speculation in the securities markets, but its actions 
had the unintended effect of increasing the real cost of credit for the 
general economy. Tight credit conditions, particularly in view of the 
continuing demand by investors for security loans, precipitated a 
sharp economic downturn in the summer of 1929.128 
 
 The Federal Reserve’s third (and most fateful) mistake was that it 
failed to counteract the destabilizing effects of a series of regional 
banking panics, which began in late 1930 and culminated in the na-
tionwide banking holiday of March 1933. The banking panics pro-
duced a severe contraction in the nation’s money supply by freezing 
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the deposits held by failed banks and by encouraging depositors in 
open banks to convert their deposits into currency. Bank failures also 
depressed economic activity by disrupting the flow of credit to busi-
nesses, especially small and medium-sized firms that could not obtain 
financing through the securities markets. The Federal Reserve failed 
to make sustained, large-scale purchases of government securities and 
bank acceptances in order to offset declines in the nation’s money 
supply. In addition, the Federal Reserve did not act as lender of last 
resort for the banking system. Many economists believe that the Fed-
eral Reserve’s failure to respond to the progressive collapse of the 
banking system turned the sharp recession of 1929–30 into the Great 
Depression of 1931–33.129 
 
 The Federal Reserve’s policy mistakes were important factors 
that help to explain the intensity of the speculative boom of the 1920s 
and the severity of the economic collapse of the early 1930s. Senator 
Glass himself assigned much of the blame to the Federal Reserve.130 
At the same time, there is substantial support for Glass’s claim that 
banks and their securities affiliates bore significant responsibility for 
the boom-and-bust cycle of 1921–33. Contemporary scholars and 
members of Congress pointed out that banks and their affiliates 
played key roles in arranging the debt and equity financing that fueled 
the economic boom of the 1920s. Contemporary observers also 
stressed the linkage between the abundant financing of the 1920s and 
the leverage and overinvestment that aggravated the economic col-
lapse of the 1930s.131 
 
 Two recent studies provide additional evidence supporting Sena-
tor Glass’s view. Eichengreen and Mitchener documented the exis-
tence of a credit boom in the United States and several other countries 
during the second half of the 1920s. They also determined that this 
credit boom contributed to the economic slump of the 1930s, particu-
larly in nations (like the United States) in which the credit boom was 
accompanied by a stock market boom.132 
 
 Cole, Ohanian, and Leung found that productivity shocks ac-
counted for about two-thirds of the output changes in 17 countries 
during 1929–33, while monetary/deflation shocks accounted for the 
remaining third. Consequently, they concluded that productivity 
shocks were more important than monetary factors in explaining the 
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collapse of economic output during the Great Depression. They also 
determined that productivity shocks during 1929–33 were linked to 
industrial activity and were expected by stock market investors to 
persist throughout the period. Finally, they found some support for 
the view that productivity shocks were correlated with financial mar-
ket shocks, including banking panics.133 The findings of both studies 
are broadly consistent with the understanding of Glass and his sup-
porters. As discussed earlier, Glass and his colleagues maintained that 
excessive debt and equity financing during the 1920s generated over-
investment and economic fragility, resulting in a collapse of eco-
nomic output when the sources of that financing were disrupted by 
the Crash of 1929. 
 
A Preliminary Reconsideration of the Modern Critique of 
the Glass-Steagall Act  
 Beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars have argued that the 
Glass-Steagall Act was an ill-conceived law from the outset. These 
critics have raised three principal points. First, they contend that the 
Glass-Steagall Act was self-interested legislation that was promoted 
by traditional investment banks in order to expel commercial banks 
from the securities underwriting business. Second, they maintain that 
banks with securities affiliates were safer institutions and were more 
likely to survive the banking panics of the 1930s, in comparison with 
specialized commercial banks. Third, they contend that Congress was 
largely mistaken in its belief that universal banks had endangered the 
public interest through abusive selling practices and other conflicts of 
interest. 
 
 As to the first issue, I find no evidence indicating that investment 
banks were either supporters or intended beneficiaries of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. Regarding the second and third issues, I offer pre-
liminary responses indicating that Congress had substantial reasons to 
believe that universal banks presented serious risks to the banking 
system and the broader economy. 
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Were Traditional Securities Firms Supporters or Intended 
Beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act? 
 Several scholars have advanced an “interest group” explanation 
for the Glass-Steagall Act. They contend that traditional investment 
banks encouraged Congress to adopt the 1933 legislation in order to 
remove their commercial banking rivals from the securities underwrit-
ing business.134 It is certainly true that, from the mid-1960s through 
the end of the 1980s, securities firms and their trade associations 
fought hard to maintain the wall of separation created by the 
Glass-Steagall Act. It was not until the early 1990s that leading secu-
rities firms decided to support universal banking legislation, after fail-
ing to overturn federal agency rulings that opened major loopholes in 
the Glass-Steagall Act.135 
 
 Notwithstanding the securities firms’ modern defense of the 
Glass-Steagall barriers, the available evidence does not show that tra-
ditional investment banks were supporters or intended beneficiaries of 
the Act. Jonathan Macey, a proponent of the “interest group” explana-
tion for Glass-Steagall, has acknowledged that “few hints of such fa-
voritism can be gleaned from the legislative history or from the 
statutory language itself.”136 Indeed, the “interest group” theory does 
not square with the known facts about the 1933 legislation. 
 
 The Investment Bankers Association of America (IBA), the lead-
ing trade association representing securities firms, actively opposed 
the legislation. During congressional hearings on the Glass bill in 
1932, Allan Pope, president of the IBA, strongly condemned the pro-
visions requiring commercial banks to leave the business of invest-
ment banking. Pope testified that he had met with “several hundred 
members” of the IBA in a dozen major cities, and “without a single 
exception” all those members opposed the Glass bill.137 Pope argued 
that a mandatory separation between commercial and investment 
banking would be “highly deflationary” and would “practically stop 
the security and industrial business of the country.”138 He further de-
clared that the Glass bill was “so highly detrimental to the investment 
market to-day as to unquestionably affect in a ruinous manner the 
banks throughout the country as well as investment banks.”139 
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 Pope’s testimony portrayed the IBA’s membership as being 
firmly united in opposition to the Glass bill. It could be argued that 
Pope’s testimony is not conclusive on this point. As Donald 
Langevoort has noted, “control of the [IBA] … had fallen to the com-
mercial bankers” by 1930.140 Pope himself was executive vice presi-
dent of the securities affiliate of the First National Bank of Boston.141 
Accordingly, Pope might have been inclined to exaggerate the degree 
of consensus among the IBA’s members in opposing the Glass bill. 
However, no investment bank testified in favor of the Glass bill, a 
fact that tends to support Pope’s claim that the IBA’s membership 
universally opposed the bill. 
 
 Edwin Perkins has drawn the opposite inference from the absence 
of any traditional investment bankers among the list of witnesses who 
testified at the 1931 and 1932 Senate hearings on the Glass bill. From 
this absence, Perkins inferred that “older investment banking houses 
who had been losing the competitive battle with the more aggressive 
commercial banks now thought they saw an opportunity to reestablish 
their former dominant position in the underwriting field” by support-
ing the Glass bill.142 This inference is contradicted, however, by the 
fact that leading partners of J.P. Morgan, the foremost private invest-
ment bank, strongly opposed the Glass-Steagall Act in their private 
dealings.143 For example, during the summer of 1932, Russell Lef-
fingwell, a Morgan partner with close personal connections to Frank-
lin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, wrote a personal letter urging 
Roosevelt to reject the Glass bill. Leffingwell argued that “we cannot 
cure the present deflation and depression” with the “prohibition and 
regulation stuff” proposed by Glass. Roosevelt, however, rebuffed 
Leffingwell’s entreaty. Roosevelt declared that bankers were respon-
sible for “grave abuses” during the period 1927–29, and it was there-
fore imperative for honorable bankers to “support wholeheartedly 
methods to prevent recurrence thereof.”144 Roosevelt subsequently 
made a campaign speech in which he urged the complete separation 
of commercial and investment banking.145 
 
 J.P. Morgan’s opposition to Glass-Steagall is further indicated by 
its decision in 1935 to abandon the securities business and remain a 
deposit-taking bank. Drexel & Co. (Morgan’s affiliate in Philadel-
phia) and Brown Brothers Harriman (another leading private invest-
ment bank) made the same choice. Several partners from J.P. Morgan 
and Drexel resigned to form Morgan Stanley, a new investment bank-
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ing firm. J.P. Morgan provided most of the initial financing for Mor-
gan Stanley. During the early years of Morgan Stanley’s operation, 
partners in the two firms maintained close relations, and they clearly 
hoped that Congress would amend or repeal Glass-Steagall so that 
they could once again operate as a single firm. Other traditional in-
vestment banks—including Kuhn, Loeb; Lazard Freres; and Lehman 
Brothers—opted to become securities firms. As indicated by these 
varying responses to the Glass-Steagall Act, it was doubtful whether 
traditional investment banks would actually benefit from the legisla-
tion, given (1) the heavily depressed condition of the securities mar-
kets during the early 1930s, and (2) Section 21 of the Act, which 
prohibited securities firms from accepting deposits.146 
 
 Another problem with the “interest group” explanation of 
Glass-Steagall is that the Senate’s investigation of Wall Street prac-
tices during 1932 and 1933 did not spare traditional investment 
banks. As discussed below, the Pecora committee’s investigation in 
1933 was particularly harsh toward NCC and Chase and their securi-
ties affiliates. However, the Senate’s investigation also revealed 
highly unfavorable information about traditional securities firms, in-
cluding (1) Halsey, Stuart’s role in aggressively marketing securities 
issued by the Insull utility empire prior to its bankruptcy in 1932; 
(2) Lee, Higginson’s similar promotion of securities issued by Ivan 
Kreuger’s companies before they collapsed in 1932; (3) Goldman 
Sachs’ sponsorship of Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, a highly 
leveraged investment trust whose shares became worthless by 1933; 
(4) J.P. Morgan’s similarly ill-fated sponsorship of three large in-
vestment trusts, and its practice of allocating shares of newly under-
written securities to “preferred lists” of influential politicians and 
businessmen at heavily discounted prices; and (5) Kuhn, Loeb’s and 
Dillon Read’s promotion of several investment trusts that inflicted 
large losses on ordinary investors.147 
 
 As a consequence of the Senate’s investigation, journalists 
harshly criticized J.P. Morgan and other private investment banks, 
and the public’s reaction against investment banks was “almost as 
condemnatory” as the outcry against NCB, Chase and their affiliates. 
Public attacks on investment banks helped to persuade Congress to 
enact the Securities Act of 1933 despite the lobbying efforts of Wall 
Street bankers.148 Hostility to investment banks also surfaced in Sec-
tion 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited any person or firm 
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from accepting deposits if they engaged in the business of underwrit-
ing, selling, or distributing securities.149 
 
 During the Senate debates on the Glass-Steagall Act, Senator 
Tydings of Maryland offered an amendment to Section 21. The 
Tydings amendment would have exempted investment banks from the 
prohibition on deposit taking if they satisfied certain safeguards. 
Tydings declared that he was in favor of separating commercial banks 
from the securities business. However, he argued, “private investment 
houses of the better class” (such as his constituent, Alexander Brown 
& Sons of Baltimore) performed a vital public service in “financing 
private businesses … on long-term paper.” He warned the Senate that 
Section 21 would impair the availability of credit by undermining 




 Senators Bulkley and Glass strongly opposed the Tydings amend-
ment and persuaded the Senate to reject the amendment. Bulkley de-
clared that an absolute prohibition on deposit taking by securities 
firms was “vital to the principles” of the Glass-Steagall Act. Glass 
agreed that this prohibition was a “vital provision of the bill,” because 
it would “confine to their proper business activities these large private 
concerns” and would “deny them the right to conduct the deposit 
bank business.” Glass reminded the Senate that private investment 
banks had “unloaded millions of dollars of worthless investment secu-
rities upon the banks of this country.” He also predicted that “there 
will be no difficulty … in financing any business enterprise that needs 
to be financed at a profit in this country [because] large investment 
houses will be set up in this country, just as they have been in all of 
the countries of continental Europe, and in England.” In fact, Glass 
noted, officials of Chase’s securities affiliate were already taking 
steps to reorganize the affiliate as a separate investment bank.151 
 
 The public legislative history of Section 21, including the Sen-
ate’s defeat of the Tydings amendment, supports the view that the 
Glass-Steagall Act was designed to carry out a complete separation of 
the commercial and investment banking businesses. That history 
strongly undercuts the view that Glass and his supporters sought to 
protect securities firms from competition by commercial banks. Sec-
tion 21 “severely hurt the private bankers” who chose to become se-
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curities firms, because it deprived them of an important source of 
funding (i.e., deposits) and made them more dependent on loans from 
commercial banks.152 The successful opposition of Glass and Bulkley 
to the Tydings amendment clearly indicated that investment banks 
were not intended beneficiaries of the Glass-Steagall Act.153 
 
 As Donald Langevoort has observed, the provisions and history 
of the Glass-Steagall Act demonstrate that the legislation had a “chan-
neling objective”—to confine banks to “the traditional business of 
commercial and agricultural lending” and to prevent bank deposits 
from being used to fund loans for speculative purposes.154 The avail-
able evidence—particularly with regard to Section 21—contradicts 
any inference that the Act was designed to favor securities firms.  
 
 Glass’s conduct two years later further undermines any such in-
ference. Glass tried to include a provision in the Banking Act of 1935 
that would have given commercial banks a limited authority to un-
derwrite and sell debt securities (but not equity stocks). Under Glass’s 
proposal, commercial banks could have underwritten or sold debt se-
curities to dealers or brokers (other than banks), or at public auction, 
under rules established by the Comptroller of the Currency. Glass 
argued that commercial banks should be granted a carefully limited 
power to sell debt securities because securities firms were not provid-
ing adequate long-term financing to industrial corporations.155 Since 
Glass’s proposal would have allowed commercial banks to make a 
partial reentry into the securities underwriting business, it certainly 
did not reflect any desire to protect securities firms. Indeed, Glass 
explained that he was disappointed by the poor performance of secu-
rities firms in arranging long-term financing for industrial firms, con-
trary to his optimistic expectations in 1933.156 
 
 The Senate adopted Glass’s proposal over the vocal opposition of 
Senator Robert LaFollette. In opposing Glass, LaFollette did not ex-
press any solicitude for securities firms. Instead, he reiterated the 
same arguments advanced in 1933 in favor of “a complete divorce-
ment and separation between investment and commercial banking in 
this country.” LaFollette declared that “the underwriting and sale of 
securities by commercial banks … served to wipe out the reserves and 
the savings of a lifetime which millions in this country had accumu-
lated.” In LaFollette’s view, “the whole experience of the investing 
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public and of the people of the United States during the boom and the 
depression proves that [Glass’s] proposal is loaded with dynamite as 
far as the investing public in the future is concerned.”157 Glass’s pro-
posal was opposed by the Roosevelt Administration and was omitted 
from the conference report on the 1935 legislation.158 Thus, as in the 
case of the Glass-Steagall Act, the debates on Glass’s proposal in 
1935 did not indicate any congressional purpose to protect securities 
firms from competition. 
 
Did Securities Activities Threaten the Safety of Banks During the 
1930s? 
 George Benston has concluded that “[t]he evidence from the 
pre-Glass-Steagall period is totally inconsistent with the belief that 
banks’ securities activities or investments caused them to fail or oth-
erwise caused the financial system to collapse.”159 Benston relied ex-
tensively on a study by Eugene White, who found that “[f]ew banks 
with [securities] affiliates failed; and even though Congressional hear-
ings may have uncovered some problems, the securities affiliates did 
not systematically undermine the capital or liquidity provisions of 
national banks.”160 White determined that 26.3 percent of all national 
banks failed during the period 1930–33, compared with only 
6.5 percent of banks with securities affiliates and only 7.6 percent of 
banks with large bond departments. White noted, however, that “the 
typical bank involved in investment banking was far larger than aver-
age, while most of the failures were among the smaller institu-
tions.”161 Larger banks had a higher probability of survival during the 
Great Depression, because (1) their assets were more diversified in 
comparison to smaller banks, and (2) they were more likely to receive 
financial support from other banks and the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC). Due to the higher survival rate for large banks, 
depositors shifted their funds from smaller banks to larger banks dur-
ing the banking panics of 1930–33.162 Consequently, White’s data on 
bank survival do not permit us to separate the impact of securities 
activities from the positive effect of larger size. 
 
 White also performed regressions based on data for bank failures 
during 1931. He concluded that, during that year, the presence of a 
securities affiliate “tended to reduce the likelihood of failure” while 
the presence of a bond department “did not increase the probability of 
failure.” Again, however, White’s regression analysis is not conclu-
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sive, because his sample did not enable him to measure the impact of 
differences in bank size. In addition, White did not consider the sig-
nificance of specific incidents in which major banks with securities 
affiliates failed during 1930, 1932, and 1933.163 
 
 One problem in isolating the effect of securities activities on bank 
failures is that banks failed for various reasons during the Great De-
pression. It appears, however, that losses from defaulted real estate 
loans and depreciated securities investments were two of the most 
important causes of bank failures from 1930 to 1933. As described 
above, real estate lending and investments in higher-risk securities 
were two leading sources for the financing surge of the 1920s. Both 
activities required banks to invest in assets that were subject to poten-
tial liquidity problems, and both markets experienced speculative 
booms during the 1920s. It is therefore not surprising that both activi-
ties proved to be serious threats to bank solvency during the early 
1930s. 
 
 Default rates rose rapidly for both residential and commercial 
mortgages and reached crisis proportions in 1931–32. Real estate val-
ues in many urban areas fell by a third or more in 1929–31, and a 
large number of urban real estate markets were essentially frozen by 
1932. Banks often could not liquidate defaulted loans by foreclosing 
on the real estate collateral, because no buyers were available to pay 
any reasonable price for the property. The illiquid status of defaulted 
real estate loans was a significant factor explaining the loss of bank 
capital during the 1930s.164 
 
 Many banks were also devastated by depreciation in their 
securities portfolios. As noted above, both domestic and foreign 
bonds experienced sharp increases in default rates and rapid declines 
in market values from 1931 to 1933.165 Losses on South American 
and Eastern European bonds were especially severe, as three-quarters 
of those bonds defaulted during the 1930s.166 An analysis of closed 
New York state banks found that their securities portfolios had 
suffered an average loss in market value of 37.5 percent. A similar 
study of closed Michigan banks determined that depreciation in their 
bond portfolios (particularly with regard to real estate bonds) was a 
primary reason for their failure.167 From 1929 to 1932, the losses 
suffered by national and state member banks on securities 
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investments were comparable in magnitude to their losses on loans.168 
A recent study by Calomiris and Mason confirms that defaulted real 




 Smaller banks suffered the greatest percentage losses from securi-
ties investments, because higher-risk securities represented a higher 
proportion of their investment portfolios. Among Federal Reserve 
member banks, country banks held larger amounts of foreign bonds 
and railroad bonds than reserve city banks did.170 Some commentators 
blamed country bankers for their lack of prudence in pursuing higher 
yields without regard to risk.171 However, members of Congress and 
other commentators strongly criticized securities affiliates of com-
mercial banks and traditional investment banks for aggressive market-
ing campaigns that encouraged unsophisticated country bankers to 
buy risky securities.172 Country banks relied heavily on their corre-
spondent banks in major cities for a wide range of banking services, 
including investment advice and the sale of investment securities.173 
Allan Pope, executive vice president of First National Bank of Bos-
ton’s securities affiliate, acknowledged in 1931 that country bankers 
sought his company’s investment advice because they were “unfamil-
iar with the investment markets.”174 In 1932, he testified that 600 
country banks relied on his affiliate for investment recommendations, 
“based on our broad expanse of knowledge.” According to Pope, 
some country bankers had been specifically instructed by bank exam-
iners to “take our advice in security matters.”175
 
 
 Thus, it appears that bank securities affiliates contributed to the 
failure of many small correspondent banks by persuading them to in-
vest in high-risk bonds, particularly foreign issues. The linkage be-
tween bank securities activities and bank failures is a worthwhile 
subject for future research, but for present purposes, I will simply 
note the following evidence indicating that bank securities affiliates 
did create significant risks for large banks and the banking system 
from 1930 to 1933.  
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The Failures of Several Key Banks with Securities Affiliates  
 Between 1930 and 1933, the failures or near-failures of several 
key banking organizations resulted, at least in part, from their in-
volvement in securities activities. In 1930, Caldwell and Company 
and Bank of United States failed. Those failures precipitated the first 
banking crisis of the Great Depression. In 1932, the RFC was forced 
to provide large loans in order to (1) protect the depositors of Central 
Republic Bank and (2) ensure the survival of Bank of America. In 
1933, the failure of four important banks with securities affiliates—
two in Detroit and two in Cleveland—precipitated statewide banking 
holidays that helped to trigger a nationwide banking panic. 
 
Caldwell and Company and Bank of United States 
 Caldwell and Company (CAC) established a large financial and 
industrial empire that covered much of the Southeast. CAC was a 
leading underwriter of municipal bonds, industrial revenue bonds, and 
real estate bonds throughout the Southern states. By the end of 1929, 
CAC controlled a large chain of banks with more than US$210 mil-
lion of assets, insurance companies with more than US$230 million of 
assets, and newspapers and industrial companies with almost US$50 
million of assets. In early 1930, CAC merged with BancoKentucky 
Company, which controlled 10 banks with assets of almost US$140 
million.176  
 
 CAC obtained extensive loans from its bank affiliates, as well as 
other banks in the Southeast. CAC aggressively speculated in stocks 
on Wall Street. CAC also held large amounts of illiquid securities 
representing investments in its affiliates and unsold securities from its 
underwritten offerings.177 CAC’s entire financial structure was un-
sound and collapsed in November 1930. CAC’s demise precipitated 
the failure of more than 130 banks in Arkansas, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee, thereby inflicting a severe economic shock 
on the Southeast’s regional economy.178 
 
 Bank of United States (BUS) was a New York City bank that ex-
panded rapidly during the late 1920s by acquiring five other banks. 
By May 1929, BUS had 57 branches, US$315 million of assets, and 
US$220 million of deposits. BUS controlled three securities affiliates, 
three safe deposit companies, an insurance company, and dozens of 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. y 595 
 
 
real estate affiliates.179 BUS and its real estate affiliates made large 
loans to real estate developers and invested in real estate bonds. BUS 
also made substantial loans to its officers and securities affiliates for 
the purpose of financing continuous trading in units consisting of 
BUS stock joined with the stock of its major securities affiliate. By 
1930, BUS had committed US$16 million (equal to one-third of its 
capital) to support the price of its stock units. BUS was strongly mo-
tivated to maintain the price of its stock units, because BUS had 
agreed to repurchase those units at a guaranteed price from many of 
its shareholders, including depositors to whom BUS had actively 
marketed the units.180 
 
 BUS was doomed when the real estate and stock markets slumped 
after the Crash of 1929. At the time of its failure in December 1930, 
BUS had outstanding more than US$20 million of unpaid loans to its 
securities and real estate affiliates, as well as US$11 million of unpaid 
loans to its officers and other persons that were collateralized by its 
stock units. BUS’s affiliates incurred a loss of at least US$16 million 
on their holdings of BUS stock units. Large amounts of BUS’s real 
estate loans and bonds were either in default or likely to default.181 
BUS failed after the New York state banking department and the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York could not persuade members of the 
New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA) to provide support 
for an emergency merger of BUS with two other New York City 
banks.182 BUS’s failure led to the collapse of Chelsea Bank, a smaller 
New York City Bank that was closely connected with BUS. Depositor 
runs began at two larger banks—Manufacturers Trust and Public Na-
tional—that were also linked with BUS. Members of the NYCHA 
intervened to rescue those banks and avert a more widespread bank-
ing panic.183 
 
 Scholars have debated whether BUS’s failure aggravated the eco-
nomic decline that was already under way in the United States. Re-
gardless of its direct economic impact, there can be little doubt that 
BUS’s failure had a significantly adverse impact on public confidence 
in banks. BUS ranked among the 30 largest commercial banks in the 
nation, and it was the largest single bank failure in U.S. history up to 
that time. Both domestic and international newspapers gave extensive 
coverage to BUS’s failure, because of its name and its membership in 
the Federal Reserve System. Together with the collapse of CAC, the 
596 y The Role of Universal Banks in the Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33 
 
failure of BUS produced a substantial outflow of currency from the 
banking system as depositors converted their deposits into cash. That 




The Chicago Banking Panics and Central Republic 
 In June 1931, a serious banking panic occurred in Chicago. Dur-
ing Chicago’s real estate boom of the mid-1920s, the city’s banks ex-
panded rapidly and devoted much of their resources to real estate 
lending. As the result of numerous mergers, two giant banks—
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company (Continental Illinois) 
and First National Bank of Chicago (First Chicago) controlled 
two-thirds of Chicago’s banking resources by 1931. Many of the lar-
ger Chicago banks and their securities affiliates sold real estate bonds 
to investors with an explicit or implicit undertaking to repurchase the 
bonds upon request. Chicago banks and their securities affiliates dis-
tributed other types of securities, including municipal bonds and 
bonds issued by Samuel Insull’s utility empire. Banks and their affili-
ates were also exposed to the securities markets as a consequence of 
their investment securities and security loans.185 
  
 Given their heavy involvement in real estate activities, many 
Chicago banks became highly vulnerable after the city’s real estate 
boom ended in 1928. By June 1931, a chain of banks controlled by 
the Foreman State Bank was faced with imminent depositor runs, 
because Foreman could no longer repurchase real estate bonds that its 
securities affiliate sold to depositors. To avoid the collapse of the 
entire Foreman chain, First Chicago agreed to acquire most of the 
Foreman banks with financial help from the Chicago Clearing House 
Association (CCHA). In addition, the National Bank of the Republic, 
which had been weakened by its own real estate problems, agreed to 
merge with Central Trust Company to form the Central Republic 
Bank and Trust Company (Central Republic). However, these 
measures did not prevent the demise of a chain of 12 banks controlled 
by John Bain, an aggressive real estate promoter. The Bain default 
was accompanied by the failures of another 20 banks. A full-scale 
panic was averted only when First Chicago and Continental Illinois 
publicly announced that they would support all of their local 
correspondent banks. The panic ended, but the resolution proved to be 
temporary.186 




 In the summer of 1932, another and more serious banking panic 
struck Chicago. The real estate situation in Chicago had grown worse, 
and more than US$1 billion of mortgages were in default. Chicago’s 
economy was also shaken by the collapse of the highly leveraged In-
sull utility system in the spring of 1932. Samuel Insull’s holding 
companies, headquartered in Chicago, controlled a network of public 
utility companies serving more than 5,000 communities in 36 states. 
Insull and his investment bankers, led by the Chicago firm of Halsey, 
Stuart, had promoted the sale of Insull holding company securities to 
small investors. The securities affiliates of First Chicago, Continental 
Illinois, and Central Republic had participated in the distribution of 
Insull securities to the public, and they also invested in Insull securi-
ties. By the time the Insull holding companies were declared bankrupt 
in 1932, US$2.65 billion of Insull securities had been sold to 600,000 
shareholders and 500,000 bondholders. Chicago banks extended more 
than US$150 million of loans to Insull companies and to other bor-
rowers who offered Insull securities as collateral. Insull interests 
owed US$90 million to the three leading banks, with Continental Illi-
nois holding two-thirds of those loans. The Insull debacle thus wiped 
out the personal savings of thousands of Chicago area residents and 
threatened the solvency of many Chicago banks.187 In addition, the 
Chicago city government was facing its own revenue crisis and could 
not pay its employees or bondholders.188 
 
 In this atmosphere of deepening economic crisis, Chicago 
residents lost faith in their banks. Thirty-six banks in Chicago failed 
between June 15 and 25, 1932. In sharp contrast to the 1931 panic, 
legions of frightened depositors descended on the three leading 
Chicago banks. Continental Illinois and First Chicago withstood the 
temporary panic among their depositors. In a dramatic gesture, 
Melvin Traylor, First Chicago’s chairman, climbed on a pillar in the 
bank’s lobby and persuaded a crowd of worried depositors to remain 
calm. Central Republic, however, could not withstand the pressure of 
escalating deposit withdrawals. On June 26th, Charles Dawes, 
chairman of Central Republic, informed Chicago’s banking leaders 
and officials of the recently established RFC that he would have to 
close his bank unless a rescue plan was arranged to protect all of its 
depositors.189 
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 In contrast to their successful self-help plan in 1931, Continental 
Illinois, First Chicago, and the CCHA could not finance the rescue of 
Central Republic. Chicago’s banking leaders and RFC examiners de-
termined that Central Republic needed an infusion of US$95 million 
to remain open. The Chicago banks told the RFC that they could only 
offer US$5 million in loans, thus revealing their gravely weakened 
condition. With the encouragement of President Hoover, the RFC 
determined that Central Republic must be rescued, because the bank’s 
failure would lead to depositor runs on Chicago’s remaining banks 
and a likely collapse of the entire U.S. banking system. In practical 
effect, the RFC treated Central Republic as being “too big to fail.” 
Accordingly, the RFC agreed to provide a US$90 million loan, se-
cured by all of Central Republic’s assets. The RFC’s loan allowed 
Central Republic to continue in operation temporarily, but the bank 
could not survive. The 5½ percent interest rate charged by the RFC 
substantially exceeded the bank’s return on its assets. In October 
1932, Central Republic transferred all of its deposits to a newly or-
ganized bank, and Central Republic was liquidated thereafter.190 
 
 The RFC’s protection of Central Republic’s depositors temporar-
ily calmed financial markets in Chicago and the nation. However, the 
incident revealed four very unpleasant facts about the nation’s bank-
ing situation in mid-1932. First, bank failures, which had previously 
been confined to smaller and midsized banks (except for CAC and 
BUS), were spreading to large urban banks. Second, the most vulner-
able urban banks were those that had engaged in extensive real estate 
and securities activities during the 1920s. Third, even the largest ur-
ban banks no longer had the resources to resolve serious banking pan-
ics without governmental assistance. Fourth, RFC loans provided 
only short-term relief and could not solve the fundamental problems 
confronting banks. The RFC required banks to pledge their best assets 
to secure 100 percent of the loans they received. RFC loans were 
made at penalty interest rates and could not exceed the estimated 
market or liquidation value of the banks’ collateral. RFC loans also 
became a potential trigger for depositor runs after Congress required 
publication of the names of banks receiving RFC loans. For all these 
reasons, RFC loans failed to prevent a progressive collapse of the 
banking system during 1932 and 1933.191 
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Threats to the Survival of Bank of America 
 Bank of America, like other urban banks, expanded rapidly 
through mergers and acquisitions during the boom years of the 1920s. 
By 1930, Transamerica Corp., the parent holding company of Bank of 
America, was the third largest U.S. banking organization, trailing 
only Chase and NCB. Transamerica controlled more than 400 bank 
branches and US$1.2 billion of banking assets in California, as well 
as a New York City bank with 35 branches and US$400 million of 
assets. Transamerica also acquired a Wall Street securities firm, 
Bancamerica-Blair Corporation, which operated offices in 27 U.S. 
cities and 5 foreign countries.192 Transamerica and Bancamerica-Blair 
financed substantial stock-trading operations designed to support 
Transamerica’s stock price. Both companies also actively invested in 
other stocks, and Bancamerica-Blair was a major distributor of 
securities to retail customers.193 
 
 By 1931, Bank of America and Transamerica found themselves in 
great difficulty. Bank of America was rapidly losing deposits, and 
many of its residential and commercial real estate loans were in 
default or danger of default. Transamerica and Bancamerica-Blair 
suffered large losses on their stock investments and loans on 
securities. Elisha Walker, the recently elected chairman of 
Transamerica, decided to retrench. He engineered the sale of the New 
York City bank and Bancamerica-Blair to NCB in October 1931. 
Walker completed this transaction over the strenuous opposition of 
A.P. Giannini, the founder and former chairman of Bank of America 
and Transamerica.194 
 
 A fight for corporate control ensued. Giannini prevailed in a 
proxy contest and regained control of Transamerica in February 1932. 
The RFC immediately offered to provide up to US$100 million of 
credit to support Giannini’s rehabilitation plan for Bank of America. 
The RFC ultimately loaned US$65 million to Bank of America and 
Transamerica, thereby helping Giannini to rebuild Bank of Amer-
ica.195 As in the case of Central Republic, the RFC determined that 
Bank of America’s survival was crucial to the stability of the U.S. 
banking system. The RFC made US$1.1 billion of loans to help banks 
between February 1932 and March 1933. Of that amount, US$155 
million, or 14 percent, was devoted to the support of Central Republic 
and Bank of America.196 
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Major Bank Failures in Detroit and Cleveland in 1933 
 During the late 1920s, two major bank holding companies were 
created in Michigan through a series of mergers and acquisitions—the 
Detroit Bankers Company (Detroit Bankers) and the Guardian Detroit 
Union Group (Guardian). By 1931, both groups owned banks 
throughout the state of Michigan and controlled three-fifths of the 
banking resources in Detroit and the state as a whole. Detroit Bankers 
and Guardian flourished during the economic boom experienced by 
Detroit and Michigan during the 1920s, as a result of the automotive 
industry’s rapid expansion. Both organizations made large amounts of 
residential and commercial real estate loans. In addition, both compa-
nies established securities affiliates, which invested in the stocks of 
their parent holding companies and in other securities. Both groups 
also made security loans to finance investments by their officers, di-
rectors, and other persons in the groups’ holding company stocks and 
other stocks.197 
 
 Both Detroit Bankers and Guardian were in serious trouble by 
1932. Domestic production of automobiles, which was heavily con-
centrated in the area around Detroit, fell by three-quarters between 
1929 and 1932. Detroit’s economy was devastated by a drastic de-
cline in economic activity and high unemployment caused by the 
automotive industry’s severe slump.198 By the end of 1932, property 
values in Detroit had fallen by nearly half, and there were no buyers 
to whom the banks could sell their foreclosed real estate. The two 
Detroit banking groups experienced cascading defaults on their real 
estate mortgages. About a third of Guardian’s total assets were com-
mitted to real estate loans or investments in real estate, while real es-
tate commitments represented about 40 percent of the banking assets 
of Detroit Bankers.199 
 
 Both banking groups also suffered heavy losses from their securi-
ties activities. The Guardian banks held large amounts of the holding 
company’s stock as collateral for loans, and the value of that stock 
plummeted from US$350 to US$5.50 per share by May 1932. In ad-
dition, the holding company, supported by its largest bank and major 
shareholders, obtained US$7 million of loans from New York banks 
to enable its securities affiliates to carry depreciated securities in their 
inventories. A Guardian executive later acknowledged that one of 
Guardian’s securities affiliates inflicted “several millions” of losses 
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on the group.200 Similarly, by 1932 the largest bank in the Detroit 
Bankers group held US$25 million of loans collateralized by the 
holding company’s stock, which had fallen in value from US$300 to 
US$9 per share. From 1931 to 1932, Detroit Bankers incurred losses 
of at least US$29 million on securities investments.201 
 
 Guardian asked for the RFC’s assistance in 1932, and the RFC 
provided an US$8.7 million loan. In January 1933, Guardian asked 
for an additional US$50 million to save itself from imminent collapse. 
However, the RFC determined that Guardian’s available assets could 
only support a loan of US$37 million. In a desperate effort to arrange 
a rescue package, the RFC and the Hoover Administration urged 
Henry Ford, Guardian’s largest shareholder, to subordinate his depos-
its in Guardian’s banks. Ford refused, and he also threatened to with-
draw his deposits from banks owned by Detroit Bankers, a step that 
would have ensured their demise. To avoid the simultaneous failure 
of Guardian and Detroit Bankers, Michigan’s governor declared a 
statewide bank holiday on February 14, 1933. Both banking groups 
were placed in receivership and were too weak to be reopened after 
the national bank holiday ended in March. With the help of the RFC, 
Ford and General Motors took the lead in organizing and capitalizing 
two new banks to serve the Detroit area.202 
 
 The Michigan bank holiday had a devastating effect on public 
confidence in banks across the country. For the first time, the RFC 
had failed in its efforts to rescue major urban banks that were consid-
ered essential to the stability of the banking system. Almost immedi-
ately, the two largest banking groups in Cleveland—the Union Trust 
Company (Union Trust) and the Guardian Trust Company (Guardian 
Trust)—suffered heavy deposit withdrawals.203 Similar to the big De-
troit banks, Union Trust and Guardian Trust had grown rapidly during 
the 1920s and were heavily engaged in real estate lending and real 
estate investments. In addition, by 1933 the two groups held a total of 
US$25 million of unpaid loans extended to the insolvent empires of 
Cyrus Eaton and the Van Sweringen brothers.204 
 
 Union Trust and Guardian Trust also resembled the Detroit banks 
in their extensive involvement in securities investment and trading 
activities. By 1932, Union Trust and Guardian Trust had incurred 
losses of US$16.4 million and US$6.6 million, respectively, from 
depreciation in their securities portfolios. Both groups included secu-
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rities affiliates. Guardian Trust’s securities affiliate was relatively 
small, but Union Trust’s affiliate was a major regional distributor of 
securities. By 1933, the net worth of both affiliates was essentially 
zero, and together they owed about US$5 million to their parent hold-
ing companies.205 
 
 The RFC extended about US$30 million of loans to Union Trust 
and Guardian Trust in 1932, but the Cleveland banks were too deeply 
insolvent to be saved in 1933.206 On February 27, the Ohio legislature 
authorized all Ohio banks to impose stringent limits on deposit with-
drawals. Those restrictions were immediately applied by the Cleve-
land banks. By March 4, every other state had followed Michigan and 
Ohio in declaring some type of bank holiday or other restriction on 
deposit withdrawals. Following the national bank holiday, Union 
Trust and Guardian Trust were liquidated. Many of their deposits 
were transferred to other Cleveland banks, which reopened with RFC 
assistance.207 
 
Large Losses at Other Major Banks with Securities Affiliates 
 As shown above, the failures of several large banking organiza-
tions with extensive securities activities played key roles in the pro-
gressive collapse of the U.S. banking system from 1930 to 1933. In 
addition, three of the four banks with the largest securities affiliates in 
1930—NCB, Chase, and Continental Illinois208—incurred heavy 
losses and experienced wrenching changes during the next few years. 
NCB’s affiliate, NCC, suffered losses of US$100 million during the 
period 1930 to 1933, including heavy losses on its equity invest-
ments. NCB was burdened with US$80 million of frozen “bridge 
loans” extended to NCC clients in expectation of bond offerings that 
were never completed, as well as several million dollars of loans ex-
tended to NCB’s officers to finance their purchases of NCB’s stock. 
NCB recorded total losses of US$170 million from 1930 to 1934, 
wiping out two-thirds of its shareholders’ equity at the end of 1929.209 
 
 Chase’s affiliate, CSC, wrote down its capital by US$55 million 
during the period 1930 to 1933, reflecting heavy losses on its equity 
investments. Chase reported total losses of US$130 million from 
1930 to 1934, reducing its net worth at the end of 1929 by more than 
half. Many of Chase’s losses resulted from (1) loans made to the Re-
public of Cuba to support CSC’s underwriting of Cuban bonds, and 
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(2) loans and equity investments in support of General Theatres 
Equipment, a bankrupt company that had been a major client of 
CSC.210 
 
 Continental Illinois suffered the worst losses in proportion to its 
capital, due in large part to its heavy involvement with Samuel In-
sull’s utility system. Continental Illinois recorded US$110 million of 
losses from 1932 to 1933. It was the first major bank to sell preferred 
stock to the RFC in connection with the recapitalization authority 
granted to the RFC under the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. Con-
tinental Illinois sold US$50 million of preferred stock to the RFC and 
reduced its own common stock to US$25 million, thereby recognizing 
that the RFC would hold the controlling interest in the bank. The RFC 
promptly designated a new chairman for Continental Illinois.211 NCB 
and Chase also each sold US$50 million of preferred stock to the 
RFC in late 1933, a step that helped each of them to write off losses 
on depreciated investments and nonperforming loans.212 
 
 The RFC bought more than US$360 million of preferred stock 
from 40 of the 100 largest U.S. banks.213 By the time the preferred 
stock program ended in 1935, the RFC had provided US$1.3 billion 
of new capital to 6,800 banks. At that point, the RFC held one-third 
of all bank capital, and it was a stockholder in half of the nation’s 
banks.214 The magnitude of these figures indicates the weakness of the 
U.S. banking industry in 1933 and the strong need for 
government-sponsored recapitalization. The RFC staff determined 
that only 20 of the banks that sold preferred stock to the RFC had no 
real need for additional capital.215 Together with the newly created 
program of federal deposit insurance, the RFC’s preferred stock pro-
gram played a key role in helping the banking system to recover after 
the national bank holiday.216 
 
 Notwithstanding RFC help, the banks that had profited most from 
the boom years of the 1920s still bore painful scars from the Great 
Depression. In mid-1933, the stock prices for NCB, Chase, and Con-
tinental Illinois were all more than 90 percent below their peak 1929 
values.217 In sharp contrast to the 1920s, large banks no longer found 
it easy to raise new capital in the depressed securities markets of the 
early 1930s.218 Responding to this “capital crunch,” even the largest 
banks “scrambled to shed asset risk” by shifting from loans to highly 
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liquid assets like government securities and cash reserves.219 The 
amount of outstanding bank loans fell almost in half from 1931 to 
1935, while the percentage of bank funds invested in government se-
curities nearly tripled during the period 1929 to 1934.220 Thus, the 
drought in new bank lending and the halting recovery of the nation’s 
economy after 1933 can be attributed, at least in part, to the banks’ 
desire to increase their liquidity and reduce their credit risk exposure, 
given the terrible losses they had suffered from 1930 to 1933.221 
 
Was Congress Correct in Believing That Securities Affili-
ates of Banks Were Linked to Conflicts of Interest and 
Other Abusive Practices? 
 Several modern scholars have contended that Congress in 1933 
did not have solid evidence for its belief that securities affiliates of 
commercial banks had committed serious abuses. Those scholars have 
pursued two major lines of attack on the Glass-Steagall Act. First, in a 
series of studies, scholars have concluded that “on average, the [secu-
rities affiliates of] banks did not sell any worse securities than compa-
rable investment banks.”222 Second, George Benston has contended 
that the Pecora committee’s investigation “reveals surprisingly little 
support for the charges of abuse” by NCB, Chase, and their securities 
affiliates. Benston concludes that “the record does not support the 
belief that the pre-Glass-Steagall period was one of abuses and con-
flicts of interest on the part of banks involved with securities transac-
tions, either directly or through affiliates.”223 
 
 I intend to provide a more complete response to these findings in 
a future article, after I have completed a full review of the Pecora 
hearings. For purposes of the present discussion, I offer two prelimi-
nary comments. First, Congress’s decision to adopt the Glass-Steagall 
Act was not premised on the view that the underwriting record of 
commercial banks was worse than the underwriting performance of 
investment banks. Instead, Congress concluded that the involvement 
of commercial banks in securities underwriting was dangerous be-
cause (1) it compromised the banks’ ability to act as impartial alloca-
tors of credit and as objective providers of investment advice, and (2) 
it created a hypercompetitive underwriting market that encouraged 
both commercial and investment banks to promote speculative, 
high-risk issues. Second, a number of scholars have concluded, in 
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contrast to Benston, that the Pecora committee did uncover substan-
tial evidence of abusive conduct by NCB and Chase, the two largest 
commercial banks with the two most important securities affiliates. 
 
The Comparative Underwriting Performance of Commercial 
Bank Affiliates and Traditional Investment Banks  
 A number of scholars have examined the comparative underwrit-
ing record of commercial bank affiliates and traditional investment 
banks during the 1920s. Two early studies concluded that the per-
formance of securities underwritten by commercial bank affiliates, in 
terms of default history and stability of market price, was about the 
same as the record for securities underwritten by traditional invest-
ment banks.224 Using regression analysis, three modern studies found 
that securities underwritten by commercial bank affiliates generally 
performed better than securities underwritten by investment banks.225 
However, two of those studies determined that commercial bank af-
filiates underwrote higher-quality securities. In this regard, the bonds 
underwritten by bank affiliates (1) were typically issued in bigger 
amounts by larger and more seasoned issuers and (2) carried lower 
yields (i.e., higher prices to investors). Thus, the superior perform-
ance of bonds underwritten by commercial bank affiliates was consis-
tent with the fact that those bonds exhibited lower risk and “were 
priced higher” at the time of their issuance.226 Bank affiliates were 
involved in syndicated offerings that typically included a larger num-
ber of underwriters, thereby indicating that bank affiliates were cho-
sen for their “large distribution networks that [could] provide a 
comparative advantage in handling large, syndicated issues.”227 
 
 The foregoing studies indicate that the underwriting performance 
of commercial bank affiliates was generally comparable to the record 
for traditional investment banks, after taking account of the higher 
quality of bonds underwritten by the bank affiliates. However, two of 
the studies also identified outliers in the bank affiliate and investment 
bank groups. One study found that bonds underwritten by J.P. 
Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb, the leading private investment banks, 
compiled the best default performance among all underwriters for 
bonds issued during the period 1926 to 1930.228 In contrast, bonds 
underwritten by NCB and Chase, the two largest banks with the two 
most important securities affiliates, posted a default record that was 
inferior to the performance of bonds underwritten by other bank 
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affiliates and, in one study, was also worse than the performance of 
bonds underwritten by investment banks.229 In addition, the stock 
prices of NYSE-listed companies that issued bonds underwritten by 
NCB and Chase performed “somewhat more poorly” than 
NYSE-listed companies that issued bonds underwritten by other 
underwriters.230 Thus, the two commercial bank affiliates that were 
most prominent in the securities business, and that received the 
greatest scrutiny during the Pecora hearings, produced the worst 
overall record among bank affiliates. 
 
 Although the foregoing studies provide important data regarding 
the comparative underwriting performance of bank affiliates and 
investment banks, they do not respond to the core concerns of 
Congress in 1933. Congress did not enact the Glass-Steagall Act 
because it thought that commercial bank affiliates were more 
unscrupulous or less competent than traditional investment banks. 
Instead, Congress concluded that the involvement of commercial 
banks in securities underwriting was dangerous because (1) it 
promoted excessive competition within the underwriting business and 
encouraged both commercial banks and investment banks to abandon 
prudential standards and promote speculative, unsound issues, and (2) 
it undermined the ability of commercial banks to act as impartial 
allocators of credit and objective providers of investment advice. In 
addition, Congress determined that it was hazardous to link the 
lending capacity of deposit-taking banks with the placing power of 
securities underwriters. In Congress’s view, the linkage of the two 
activities had produced a financing surge that led to speculative 
overinvestment during the period 1924 to 1929 and economic 
catastrophe during the period 1930 to 1933. Accordingly, the 
Glass-Steagall Act was motivated by Congress’s desire to prevent 
excessive speculation in the financial markets that could spill over 
into the general economy. Congress believed that the removal of 
deposit-taking banks from the securities underwriting business was a 
prophylactic measure needed to accomplish its anti-speculative 
purpose.231 
 
 During its deliberations on the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress did 
not focus on the comparative underwriting performance of commer-
cial bank affiliates and investment banks because that comparison 
was not pertinent to its central objective. As indicated above, Con-
gress clearly believed that investment banks engaged in abusive prac-
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tices and promoted the sale of highly speculative securities (especially 
those issued by foreign governments, investment trusts, and utility 
holding companies) during the 1920s.232 Congress’s investigation of 
investment banks provided the impetus for several statutes designed 
to regulate the conduct of firms that issue and underwrite securities, 
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940.233 Congress determined that its 
anti-speculative purpose could be accomplished by restricting the 
lending power of investment banks. Congress adopted Section 21 of 
the Glass-Steagall Act to prohibit investment banks from accepting 
deposits, thereby severing underwriters of securities from a major 
funding source.234 In contrast, Congress did not see any reliable 
means, short of strict separation, for keeping commercial banks from 
using their deposit-based lending capacity to promote speculative and 
destructive behavior in the securities markets.235 
 
The Pecora Committee’s Evidentiary Record 
 The hearing transcripts and summary report produced by the 
Pecora committee during its investigation of 1933–34 are the primary 
sources of evidence relating to allegations of conflicts of interest and 
other abusive practices involving securities affiliates of commercial 
banks.236 After reviewing those materials, George Benston concluded 
that the Pecora committee’s investigation produced “very little 
evidence” of the alleged abuses.237 Relying in part on Benston’s work, 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales similarly contend that “there is 
little evidence of the purported abuses in the specific cases examined 
by the Pecora Committee.”238 The conclusions of Benston, Rajan, and 
Zingales differ from the views of earlier scholars who reviewed the 
records of the Pecora investigation. I will not attempt to resolve this 
scholarly disagreement in this chapter. However, I intend to present 
my own evaluation of the Pecora hearings in a future article. For 
present purposes, I will provide a brief overview of the findings of 
scholars who have disagreed with Benston, Rajan, and Zingales. 
 
 Prior to Benston, W. Nelson Peach provided the most extensive 
analysis of the Pecora hearings. As Peach noted, the hearings focused 
particularly on NCB, Chase, and their securities affiliates (NCC and 
CSC). Peach determined that the Pecora investigation produced evi-
dence of “[a] great many abuses and defects … in connection with the 
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operation of security affiliates by national banks.”239 Peach grouped 
those alleged abuses into four general categories: (1) the sale of “un-
sound and speculative securities,” accompanied by prospectuses that 
contained “untruthful and misleading information”; (2) “pool opera-
tions” that manipulated the stock prices of industrial corporations and 
the affiliates’ parent banks; (3) “the use of affiliates for the personal 
profit of officers of banks and affiliates”; and (4) “the mixing of 
commercial and investment banking functions.”240 Subsequent schol-
ars have agreed with Peach that the Pecora investigation provided 
substantial support for all of these allegations. 
 
 Regarding the first alleged abuse, Peach focused on the sale of 
foreign bonds, many of which had defaulted by the time of the Pecora 
investigation. Peach and subsequent scholars determined that com-
mercial bank affiliates and traditional investment banks had been “in-
discriminate” in underwriting speculative issues of foreign bonds, due 
to the lucrative fees that could be earned from that business. Peach 
and others charged that bank affiliates and investment banks sold for-
eign bonds to unsophisticated investors without disclosure of their 
inherent risks.241 In concluding that bank affiliates sold foreign bonds 
while disregarding known risks, Peach and other scholars cited 
NCC’s decision to underwrite bonds issued by the Republic of Peru 
and the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais despite reports from NCC’s 
agents indicating that neither government would be able to repay its 
debts.242 
 
 Concerning the second alleged abuse, Peach and other scholars 
cited stock pool operations, in which NCC and CSC participated, that 
manipulated the stock prices of several major U.S. corporations. In 
addition, NCC and CSC helped to distribute shares of the same com-
panies to public investors while their pool operations were artificially 
supporting the market price. Similarly, NCC and CSC maintained 
almost continuous pools to boost the stock prices for their parent 
banks while they actively promoted the distribution of those stocks to 
public investors.243 
 
 I will not recount Peach’s analysis of alleged abuses by officers 
of NCC and CSC, since those abuses were arguably the acts of rogue 
agents rather than conflicts of interest inherent in the bank-affiliate 
system.244 In addressing the fourth alleged abuse, Peach concentrated 
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on financial arrangements between banks and their securities affili-
ates. In one case, NCB transferred to NCC US$25 million in de-
faulted Cuban sugar loans, which bank examiners had criticized. NCB 
accomplished this transfer by selling US$50 million of its stock and 
using the proceeds to increase the capital stock of NCB and NCC by 
US$25 million each. NCC transferred the US$25 million it received 
to a subsidiary, which paid the same US$25 million to NCB to buy 
the defaulted loans. NCC later wrote down the value of its subsidiary 
to US$1. In practical effect, NCB had used NCC as a dumping 
ground for its bad loans and as camouflage to prevent its shareholders 
from realizing that proceeds of NCB’s stock sale were being used to 
write off the loans.245 
 
 In a second case, Chase provided more than US$10 million of 
loans to support a public offering of US$40 million of Cuban bonds 
by CSC and other underwriters at a time when Cuba was highly 
unlikely to repay either the loans or the bonds.246 As noted above, 
Chase also lost US$70 million on equity investments and loans it 
made to support CSC’s underwriting activities for General Theatres 
Equipment, which declared bankruptcy in 1932.247 NCB suffered 
losses on US$80 million of bridge loans it extended to clients of NCC 
in connection with bond offerings that could not be completed.248 In 
addition, unsound loans and investments made by banks to support 
the activities of securities affiliates were prominent features in the 
failures of CAC, BUS, and Central Republic.249 As Peach explained, 
the symbiotic relationship between banks and their securities affiliates 
grew out of their deliberate decision to market themselves as unified, 
full-service organizations. Peach concluded that Congress could not 
have enacted legislation to prevent banks from supporting their affili-
ates without destroying the business plan on which they had operated 
during the 1920s: 
 
Affiliates and banks were legally separate corporations. In 
practice, however, they were parts of the same organization 
… providing their customers with complete financial facili-
ties under one roof. The close relationship between banks 
and affiliates was intentionally fostered, and it was due to 
their ability to convince the investing public that bank and 
affiliate were part of the same organization that affiliates 
were able to sell such a large volume of securities during the 
twenties. Since, when the securities were sold, the public had 
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been persuaded that bank and affiliate were parts of the same 
organization, the bank could not escape responsibility for the 
activities of its affiliate when the securities began to decline 
in value after the stock market crisis of 1929. It became nec-
essary for banks to assist their affiliates because they were 
aware that any diminution in the good will of their affiliates 
would bring with it a corresponding diminution in their own. 
This is the chief difficulty in the affiliate system. … Any 
legislation which sought to prevent such relationships and 
the advantages arising from them would automatically de-
stroy the basis on which the affiliate system was estab-
lished.250 
 
 The most prominent example of Peach’s thesis was NCB. By 
1929, NCB was a “global, all-purpose financial intermediary [that] 
provided corporations, households, and governments with commer-
cial banking, investment banking, and trust services.”251 NCB and its 
affiliates operated as a single enterprise that worked together to “tai-
lor financial packages to the customer’s requirements.”252 Accord-
ingly, the concept of an integrated, full-service financial intermediary 
was “the rationale underpinning National City’s comprehensive strat-
egy.”253 Charles Mitchell publicly embraced this strategy when he 
declared that NCB’s goal was to give its clients “a complete banking 
and investment and trust service. … Now, if those businesses can be 
done by a single organization it is very much the better. … Those are 
all functions which the average client likes to conduct under one roof, 
so to speak.”254 As the conduct of NCB, Chase, and other banks dem-
onstrated, the 1920s concept of full-service department store banking 
strongly encouraged commercial banks to support their securities af-
filiates whenever the affiliates encountered serious problems.255 
 
 The abuses catalogued by Peach, particularly those dealing with 
the use of bank resources to support securities affiliates, appear to be 
substantial and warrant further analysis of the evidence produced by 
the Pecora investigation. Peach’s doubts about the wisdom of allow-
ing banks to combine lending, securities investments, securities un-
derwriting, and investment advice are similar to current concerns 
about the highly integrated nature of today’s financial conglomerates.  
For the same reasons voiced by Charles Mitchell, financial conglom-
erates currently seek to create synergies by marketing their services 
under a unified brand and by presenting themselves to customers as a 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. y 611 
 
 
single enterprise offering “one-stop shopping.” Moreover, these insti-
tutions routinely offer package deals that combine lending and securi-
ties underwriting services for corporate clients. The close 
relationships among affiliated subsidiaries within a financial con-
glomerate make it unlikely that structural firewalls will be able to 
prevent serious problems in one subsidiary from endangering the en-
tire organization.256 Accordingly, a careful review of the Pecora 
committee’s investigation of NCB, Chase, and other universal banks 
of the 1920s may shed useful light on the potential risks of today’s 
financial conglomerates. 
 
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
 Carter Glass, Henry Steagall, and their supporters offered a cri-
tique of universal banking that was more persuasive than their mod-
ern critics have acknowledged. In Congress’s view, universal banks 
helped to foster a speculative boom from 1924 to 1929 that produced 
high-risk investments, hazardous debt burdens, and overextended real 
estate and industrial sectors, all of which contributed to the economic 
bust of 1930–33. Congress also determined that problems created by 
universal banks were important factors in the progressive collapse of 
the banking system during the period 1930–33. Congress placed 
much of the blame for the Great Depression on policy mistakes made 
by the Federal Reserve System from 1924 to 1933. However, Con-
gress believed that universal banks helped to lay the foundation for 
the economic calamity that occurred during the early 1930s. 
 
 Based on the analysis set forth above, I have reached the follow-
ing tentative conclusions regarding the claims made by Glass and his 
supporters in 1931–33. First, universal banks contributed to the ex-
traordinary economic boom of 1924–29 by significantly expanding 
their involvement in five separate financing channels—loans on secu-
rities, securities investments, public offerings of securities, real estate 
mortgages, and consumer credit. Second, the large-scale entry of 
commercial banks into the securities markets created competitive 
pressures that caused commercial bank affiliates and traditional in-
vestment banks to abandon prudential standards and promote highly 
speculative domestic and foreign ventures. Third, the financing surge 
of the 1920s produced unsustainable asset booms in both the real es-
tate and securities markets. It also left the consumer and business sec-
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tors in a highly fragile condition at the end of 1929, due to their heavy 
debt burdens and risky investments. 
 
 Fourth, universal banks also contributed significantly to banking 
problems during the period 1930–33. The largest universal banks, 
which were also money center banks, undermined the soundness of 
smaller correspondent banks by encouraging them to purchase 
high-risk securities during the 1920s. Losses on securities proved to 
be a major cause of bank failures during the 1930s. In addition, sev-
eral large universal banks failed in 1930, 1932, and 1933. Those fail-
ures triggered regional banking panics and also caused a widespread 
loss of depositor confidence in the banking system. Other universal 
banks avoided failure only because they received timely assistance 
from the RFC. Failures or near-failures of universal banks typically 
resulted from decisions by bankers to make risky investments and 
loans to support their own stock prices and to prop up affiliates and 
customers of those affiliates. 
 
 The experience of the U.S. banking industry from 1921 to 1933 
raises provocative questions about the possible linkages between fi-
nancial liberalization, broader powers for banks, asset booms, bank-
ing crises, and economic depressions. The evidence reviewed above 
suggests a clear connection between the liberalization of bank powers 
after 1910 and the tremendous expansion of financing for consumers 
and business firms after 1920. The financing surge of the 1920s coin-
cided with extraordinary asset booms in the real estate and securities 
markets, and with rapid growth in business facilities and inventories. 
When the easy availability of credit and equity financing ended in 
1929, the asset booms collapsed, followed quickly by sharp declines 
in consumer demand and industrial production. Within a year after the 
collapse of the asset booms, serious banking problems began to 
emerge. Were all of these events causally related? 
 
 In searching for answers to this question, scholars have reviewed 
the experiences of other nations during the 1920s and 1930s. Scholars 
have found that nations with prominent universal banks (e.g., Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany) experienced severe banking 
crises because their banks were weakened by close linkages with 
troubled industries. In contrast, nations with specialized banks that 
were barred from engaging in securities dealing or underwriting (e.g., 
Canada and the United Kingdom) survived the 1930s without a major 
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banking crisis. In addition, the presence of effective lenders of last 
resort in Canada and the United Kingdom helped to stabilize their 
banking systems.257 
 
 A particularly interesting contrast can be drawn between the ex-
periences of the United Kingdom and the United States during this 
period. The narrow powers, oligopolistic structure, and conservatism 
of major U.K. banks during the 1920s contrasted sharply with the 
broad powers, competitiveness, and aggressive policies of leading 
U.S. banks. The United Kingdom experienced no boom during the 
1920s but also avoided any banking crisis or severe economic slump 
during the 1930s. Does the U.K. experience suggest that countries 
that forgo financial liberalization can avoid the threat of a 
boom-and-bust cycle but must assume the risks of economic stagna-
tion? Many British leaders were unhappy with the performance of the 
U.K. banking industry during the 1920s. Indeed, the 1931 report of 
the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry called upon Par-
liament to allow U.K. banks to enter the securities markets, as U.S. 
banks had done during the 1920s.258 Of course, the Macmillan report 
was issued before the magnitude of the U.S. banking crisis became 
evident. 
 
 The experience of Japan since 1985 presents another instructive 
case study, which includes a number of features similar to the U.S. 
experience of 1921–33. Japan’s government gradually deregulated its 
financial markets and followed a liberal monetary policy during the 
second half of the 1980s. During that period, Japan’s economy bene-
fited from a rapid growth in financing through increased bank lending 
and the issuance of new securities. The government allowed Japanese 
corporations to secure cheaper credit through increased access to the 
Japanese bond market and the Eurobond market. Because large Japa-
nese corporations cut their demand for bank loans, Japanese banks 
eagerly expanded their involvement in real estate lending. Japanese 
banks were not allowed to engage in securities underwriting, but they 
were permitted to own corporate stocks. During the 1980s, Japanese 
banks built up huge portfolios of corporate shares to profit from the 
booming stock market and also to maintain strong cross-shareholding 
relationships with nonbank firms in the banks’ respective corporate 
groups (keiretsu). Japanese regulators and the Basel Capital Accord of 
1988 encouraged these stock investments by allowing Japanese banks 
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to rely on unrealized capital gains from their stock portfolios to sat-
isfy a significant portion of their capital requirements. 
 
 The rapid expansion of securities issuances, securities 
investments, and bank loans produced a “bubble economy” in Japan 
during the late 1980s, as reflected in dramatic booms in the real estate 
and securities markets. Given the abundant sources of new financing, 
Japanese firms greatly increased their investments in production 
facilities, equipment, and real estate projects. In an effort to restrain 
the “bubble economy,” the Bank of Japan tightened its monetary 
policy significantly in 1990. The Bank of Japan’s restrictive monetary 
regime triggered a progressive collapse of both the securities and real 
estate markets. Japanese banks cut back on their lending, because 
they were burdened with severely depreciated stock portfolios and an 
estimated US$1 trillion in nonperforming loans. The reluctance of 
Japanese banks to make new loans produced a severe “credit crunch” 
that lasted from the mid-1990s through 2004. Industrial production 
and consumer spending declined sharply during the 1990s, resulting 
in a prolonged economic slump. Despite more than US$1 trillion of 
government stimulus programs and another US$200 billion of 
government assistance for banks, the Japanese economy stagnated 
and several leading banks, securities firms, and insurance companies 
failed. Other major financial institutions survived only through 
government-supported mergers. Only in 2005 did analysts glimpse 
the beginning of a sustained recovery in the Japanese economy and 
banking system. As in the case of the worldwide Great Depression of 
the 1930s, analysts have studied the Japanese crisis to find clues to 
the apparent connections between financial liberalization, asset 
booms, and increased risks for systemic banking and economic 
crises.259 
 
 Finally, one might ask whether dangerous asset booms are more 
likely to occur during periods when major financial institutions face 
intense competitive pressures and also have a greater ability to exploit 
conflicts of interest. The concerns expressed by Congress in 1933 
about universal banking powers—particularly with regard to conflicts 
of interest and links between lending and securities underwriting—
have already been echoed by some commentators on the collapse of 
Enron and WorldCom and other financial scandals during the U.S. 
boom-and-bust cycle of 1994–2002.260 I intend to examine those 
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scandals in a forthcoming article and to evaluate whether reforms are 
needed in the supervision of financial conglomerates. 
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